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Contrary to the numerous accounts of fragmentation in investment
arbitration case law, this Article shows that the case law depicts a high degree
of cohesion. The Article argues that jurisprudence in investment arbitration
is stabilized by distinct mainstream interpretations of the key provisions of
bilateral investment treaties, the main legal instrument in international
investment law. The Article considers the frequently cited disagreements
among arbitral tribunals in light of competing commitments to either
regulatory pluralism or harmonization. It demonstrates that the vast majority
of tribunals interpret bilateral investment treaties in a way that circumscribes
pluralism and furthers the harmonization of the standards applicable to
foreign investors. By revealing this aspect of the case law, the Article seeks
to shift the debates over the legitimacy and the future of investment
arbitration away from fragmentation to the main principles that have guided
the harmonizing interpretations of arbitral tribunals over the past two
decades.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The uniqueness of international investment law lies primarily in its
dispute settlement mechanism known as investment arbitration or investorstate dispute settlement (ISDS). Exceptionally among all branches of
international law of global application, international investment law
empowers private parties, namely foreign investors, to enforce international
obligations of sovereign states, namely host states, through binding
procedures. Over the past two decades, investment arbitration case law has
grown at an exponential rate.1 As of January 1, 2020, the total number of
known cases mushroomed to 1023,2 dwarfing the record of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) of 593 cases by a margin of 430 cases.3 Most of these
cases were decided by the World Bank’s International Center for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).4
Despite this enormous record, both the proponents and opponents of
ISDS view it as the Achilles heel of international investment law. They note
that one of ISDS’s main problems is that it does not provide much-needed
legal certainty in investment relationships.5 This is mainly because it has
1. The first known decision rendered by the International Center for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes dates back to August 29, 1977 in the case of Adriano Gardella S.p.A. v. Gov’t of Côte d’Ivoire,
ICSID Case No. ARB/74/1 Award (Aug. 29, 1977), 1 ICSID Rep. 283 (1993). The spike in the number
of cases submitted to the Center did not begin until after 1995. See 1 INT’L CTR. FOR THE SETTLEMENT
OF INV. DISPUTES, ICSID CASELOAD – STATISTICS 7 (2017) [hereinafter ICSID CASELOAD STATISTICS].
2. U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., World Investment Report 2020, at 110, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WIR/2020 (2020) [hereinafter World Investment Report].
3. See WORLD TRADE ORG., ANNUAL REPORT 116 (2020).
4. ICSID CASELOAD STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 7 (showing the total number of cases that have
been registered under the ICSID Convention and Additional Facility Rules).
5. HOWARD MANN & KONRAD VON MOLTKE, INT’L INST. SUSTAINABLE DEV., NAFTA’S
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become rife with jurisprudential divides that impact all the legal protections
accorded to foreign investors under bilateral investment treaties (BITs), the
main legal instrument in international investment law. The lack of
interpretative consistency in ISDS has also come to the forefront of the
ongoing deliberations held by the UN Commission on International Trade
Law Working Group III, which currently serves as the principal multilateral
forum for discussions on the reform of international investment law.6
Concerns about incoherence in investment arbitration case law are so
serious that notable investment lawyers warn of a “legitimacy crisis”
looming over ISDS.7 Other lawyers do not characterize the situation as a
crisis, but they take deep interest in the issue.8 Some attribute incoherence to
CHAPTER 11 AND THE ENVIRONMENT: ADDRESSING THE IMPACTS OF THE INVESTOR-STATE PROCESS ON
ENVIRONMENT 20 (1999) (arguing with respect to NAFTA that “[t]he investor-state arbitration
process established by Chapter 11 had an anarchic aspect that reduces the predictability of any arbitration
proceeding”).
6. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement
(ISDS): Consistency and Related Matters, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.150 (2018).
7. See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1523 (2005); M.
Sornarajah, A Coming Crisis: Expansionary Trends in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in APPEALS
MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 39, 42 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2008) [hereinafter
APPEALS MECHANISM]; Charles H. Brower II, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA’s Investment Chapter,
36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 37, 52–53, 66–68 (2003); MARIEL DIMSEY, THE RESOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 35–100 (2008).
8. See generally, e.g., James Crawford, Similarity of Issues in Disputes Arising Under the Same or
Similarly Drafted Investment Treaties, in PRECEDENT IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 97 (Emmanuel
Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi, eds., 2008); Rudolf Dolzer, Perspectives for Investment Arbitration:
Consistency as a Policy Goal?, 1 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1 (2014); Leah D. Harhay, Investment
Arbitration in 2021: A Look to Diversity and Consistency, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 89, 94–97 (2011); Kaj Hobér,
Reporting from the Arbitral Shop-Floor: Treaty Interpretation in Practice, in PRACTISING VIRTUE:
INSIDE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 425 (David D. Caron et al. eds., 2015); Howard Mann,
Transparency and Consistency in International Investment Law: Can the Problems Be Fixed by
Tinkering?, in APPEALS MECHANISM, supra note 7, at 213, 219–20; August Reinisch, The Proliferation
of International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: The Threat of Fragmentation vs. the Promise of a More
Effective System? Some Reflections From the Perspective of Investment Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND FRAGMENTATION: FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF GERHARD HAFNER
107, 114–18 (Isabelle Buffard et al. eds., 2008); Gabriel Egli, Don’t Get Bit: Addressing ICSID’s
Inconsistent Application of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses to Dispute Resolution Provisions, 34 PEPP. L.
REV. 1045 (2007); August Reinisch, Necessity in International Investment Arbitration – An Unnecessary
Split of Opinions in Recent ICSID Cases? Comments on CMS v. Argentina and LG&E v. Argentina, 8 J.
WORLD INV. & TRADE 191 (2007). A minority of authors, however, are skeptical of the magnitude of the
problem. They view disagreements in the case law as a natural result of the doctrinal variation of BITs
and/or the specific facts of each dispute. See, e.g., Stanimir A. Alexandrov, On the Perceived
Inconsistency in Investor-State Jurisprudence, in THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME:
EXPECTATIONS, REALITIES, OPTIONS 60 (Jose E. Alvarez & Karl P. Sauvant eds., 2011); Judith Gill,
Inconsistent Decisions: An Issue to be Addressed or a Fact of Life?, 2 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 23
(2005); Jan Paulsson, Avoiding Unintended Consequences, in APPEALS MECHANISM, supra note 7, at
241, 244–52; STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
339 (2009). Other scholars go even further, suggesting that the excessive concern with consistency in the
THE
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the massive number of existing BITs and the wide variation in their textual
formulation.9 Others explain it by the lack of a centralized dispute settlement
mechanism similar to that of the WTO.10 A third group traces what it calls a
“conceptual mess” to the heterogeneity of the backgrounds of arbitrators and
practitioners, which reflects on their divergent takes on almost all matters in
the field.11
This Article offers a different account of the jurisprudential schisms in
ISDS. Like previous critiques, it recognizes disagreements among arbitral
tribunals which pertain to all the legal protections under BITs. But contrary
to the notion expressed or implied in those critiques that investment
arbitration case law is fragmented or chaotic, this Article argues that the case
law shows a high degree of cohesion. The Article explains that this cohesion
stems from the staunch commitment shared by most arbitral tribunals to the
harmonization of the legal standards applicable to foreign investors. The
Article shows how such a commitment guides the enforcement of the
principal provisions of BITs in ISDS. Viewed through this prism, arbitral
tribunals’ operationalization of BITs turns out to be largely stable and certain
or, at least, constantly progressing in this direction.
The Article traces incongruent decisions in ISDS to profounder
disagreements over the role harmonization or its opposite—pluralism—
should play under international investment law.12 It constructs the preceding
case law is counterproductive as it may force tribunals to prioritize predictability and coherence over the
factual specificities of disputes and the text of applicable BITs. See Thomas Schultz, Against Consistency
in Investment Arbitration, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING
THEORY INTO PRACTICE 297 (Zachary Douglas et al. eds., 2014); Irene M. Ten Cate, The Costs of
Consistency: Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 418 (2013).
9. See IOANA TUDOR, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 19–52 (2008); Catherine Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment
Standard in International Investment Law 2 (OECD, Working Paper No. 2004/03, 2004) (highlighting
the differences in the formulation of the fair and equitable treatment standard in BITs); see also Anna
Joubin-Bret, The Growing Diversity and Inconsistency in the IIA System, in APPEALS MECHANISM, supra
note 7, at 137, 137–38; Patrick Juillard, Variation in the Substantive Provisions and Interpretation of
International Investment Agreements, in APPEALS MECHANISM, supra note 7, at 81, 90–93.
10. See Stephan W. Schill, W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of
International Investment Law, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 875, 890 (2011); David D. Caron, Investor State
Arbitration: Strategic and Tactical Perspectives on Legitimacy, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 513,
516–18 (2009); Barton Legum, Options to Establish an Appellate Mechanism for Investment Disputes,
in APPEALS MECHANISM, supra note 7, at 231, 234–36; Donald McRae, The WTO Appellate Body: A
Model for an ICSID Appeals Facility?, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 371 (2010).
11. See Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty
System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 48 (2013). See generally ERIC DE BRABANDERE, INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION AS PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS (2014)
(considering investment arbitration part of public international law).
12. The term “legal pluralism” is extensively used by legal sociologists to describe social contexts
where more than one legal order live side by side. See, e.g., John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 18
J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1 (1986); Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC’Y
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perspectives as two competing theories of international investment law, each
of which embodies a specific normative approach to the governance of
foreign direct investment (FDI). The Article explains how the two theories,
even if rarely pronounced in arbitral decisions, shape tribunals’ conclusions
in different cases. Indeed, the complete absence of an explicit statement of
the theories does not negate the fact that tribunals necessarily make a choice
between the two of them when deciding cases. The choices made in this
regard can arguably be inferred from the selection of a specific interpretation,
among the alternative possible interpretations, of the applicable BIT
provisions.13
In terms of scope, this Article covers five standard provisions of BITs,
which together provide the bulk of the legal protection afforded to foreign
investors under international investment law. The provisions are (1) the
definition of investment in BITs as it relates to the definition of investment
under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention; (2) national treatment (NT); (3)
most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment; (4) fair and equitable treatment
(FET); and (5) the prohibition of expropriation. So far, no comprehensive
systematization of investment arbitration case law on these provisions has
been attempted in the literature. This is still the case even though arbitral
tribunals have rendered a significant number of decisions, which makes it
possible to identify overall interpretative trends or a “mainstream view” on
each provision in ISDS.
The descriptive analysis in this Article does not aim to provide an
exclusive explanation of how arbitral tribunals decide cases. It rather seeks
to foreground and compare two conflicting theories, which the Article claims
underlie the incoherent decisions in the five main doctrinal areas of
international investment law. Yet, despite being largely descriptive, the
Article has an important normative agenda. By arguing that the case law is
far from being in flux, the Article seeks to shift the debates over the
legitimacy and the future of investment arbitration away from specific
jurisprudential cleavages to the big picture characterized by the existence of
a mainstream view in investment arbitration. The Article argues that as long
as the substance of this mainstream view is not made visible, let alone
contested, reformers may call for changes that are at best unneeded and at
worst counterproductive.
REV. 869 (1988); Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global,
30 SYDNEY L. REV. 375 (2008). As used in this Article, “pluralism” denotes a normative view of
international investment law that is more tolerant with the variation of the legal standards applicable to
foreign investors. Pluralist investment lawyers are thus less inimical to doctrinal differences among BITs
or any variance in the standards applicable to national versus foreign investors in host states.
13. On the role of ideology in the interpretative choices of judges, see DUNCAN KENNEDY, A
CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIÈCLE 133, 155–56 (1998).
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The Article proceeds as follows. Section II presents the pluralist and
harmonizing theories of international investment law, which together
provide the Article’s theoretical framework for the analysis of the case law.
Section III dives into the jurisprudential divides over the five BIT provisions
covered in the Article. The dominant and less common interpretations of
each provision are specified and explained by the opposition between the
pluralist and harmonizing theories of international investment law. Section
IV synthesizes the mainstream view in investment arbitration and introduces
two fundamental policy objectives that can be deduced from the interpretive
choices embodied in such a view. The section also explores how taking the
mainstream view into account may shift the debates over the reform of
international investment law. Section V concludes.
II. TWO COMPETING THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW
This section lays the groundwork for the analysis of incoherence in
investment arbitration case law as a manifestation of competing
commitments to pluralism or harmonization. The section presents pluralism
and harmonization as two distinct theories of international investment law.
It begins with an explanation of the relevance of these two theories to
investment arbitration. Next, it describes the theories’ substance in detail,
demonstrating the distinct outcomes the subscription to either would bring
about.
A. The Invisible Competition in the Case Law
In 2020, international investment law, or the “investment regime,” was
comprised of 3,284 agreements, 2,895 of which were BITs.14 As the main
legal instrument in the investment regime, BITs have two contradictory
characteristics. On the one hand, they are agreements entered into by two
states to promote and protect FDI between the two of them. On the other
hand, they are largely standardized treaties used by the vast majority of states
for the aforementioned purposes—FDI promotion and protection.
Accordingly, many scholars maintain that BITs are bilateral in form but
multilateral in substance.15

14. World Investment Report, supra note 2, at 106.
15. Patrick Juillard notes that “all BITs incorporate the same set of principles and rules: fair and
equitable treatment, full protection and security, national treatment, most-favored-nation (MFN)
treatment, adequate compensation in case of expropriation, etc. The reiteration of these principles and
rules from one BIT to another BIT certainly suggests that we are presently witnessing a process of
harmonization, and that the end result thereof can be no other than the creation of a unified public order
of investment.” Juillard, supra note 9, at 88.
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In light of these two characteristics, any BIT can be viewed in two
diametrically opposite ways. A BIT can be thought of as a contract between
two states in which they both agree to limit their sovereignty as a means to
promote and protect mutual FDI. Alternatively, a BIT can be considered an
adaptation or customization of a global legal regime for international
investment to the bilateral relations of two states. In the latter view, a BIT is
not really a contract but rather a specific concretization or materialization of
a global legal regime, which exists independently of the BIT. The first
conception of BITs is the foundation of the pluralist theory of international
investment law, while the second is the basis of the harmonizing theory.
The main difference between the pluralist and harmonizing theories
concerns how arbitral tribunals deal with the variation in the standards
applicable to foreign investors, whenever BIT provisions are plastic enough
to create room for interpretative flexibility.16 In these situations, tribunals
exercise their discretion in one of two ways. The first is more influenced by
the contractualist conception of BITs: tribunals adopt a more lenient stance
toward the variation of the standards applicable to different foreign investors
on the grounds that deference should be paid to whatever the state parties to
BITs agree upon in their “contracts.” The other interpretative approach is
more regime-oriented and aspires to substantively harmonize the standards
applicable to all foreign investors, despite any variations among individual
“contracts.”
These two approaches provide a framework that differs significantly
from the typical, if not the only, framework used in the literature for the
analysis of the case law, which is solely concerned with the balance arbitral
tribunals strike between foreign investors and host states. Rather than
looking at whether arbitral decisions are pro-investor or pro-state, the
pluralism-harmonization framework centers on the extent to which tribunals
allow regulatory diversity under international investment law.17
As this Article will show, sometimes tribunals explicitly state the
pluralist or harmonizing theory as a reason for upholding a specific
interpretation of a BIT provision.18 But, for the most part, the influence of
the theories is subtle, potentially counterintuitive, and cannot be discerned
16. For one of the leading attempts to document how doctrinal plasticity in international law gives
rise to competing substantive perspectives, see DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES
(1987).
17. The jurisprudential divide over the NT standard is peculiar in this regard. The same structural
opposition between pluralism and harmonization can be discerned in the interpretations of the standard.
However, the subject matter of tribunals’ disagreement is not the doctrinal variation of BITs, which is the
case under all other BIT provisions, but the possible variation in the standards host states apply to national
versus foreign investors. For more on the NT standard, see infra Section III(b).
18. See infra Section III(c).
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unless we contrast the adopted interpretation with the alternative possible
interpretations.19 Arguing that arbitral tribunals subscribe to either pluralism
or harmonization is not contradictory to their presumed loyalty to the legal
material. In fact, arbitral decisions overwhelmingly show that tribunals base
their conclusions on a thorough textual analysis of BITs.20 Even though BITs
are typically ambiguous and lack travaux préparatoires to consider as
supplementary means of interpretation,21 tribunals indelibly follow the rules
of interpretation laid down by Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).22
Yet jurisprudential disagreements persist in ISDS despite such loyalty
to the legal material. The case law shows that none of the interpretations of
the five BIT provisions covered in this Article has achieved sufficient
authority to be unanimously accepted by all tribunals.23 In some cases,
tribunals disagree with how the rules of interpretation of the VCLT are used
by other tribunals and assert that the “correct” application of these rules
supports an alternative solution.24 In other cases, tribunals do not dispute the
application of the VCLT by other tribunals but still reach entirely different
conclusions by citing other legal authorities that are of equal weight under
the VCLT.25
Absent a legalist rationale for these jurisprudential divides, the most
plausible explanation is that they are driven by different normative theories
of international investment law. This conclusion remains valid even if
arbitral decisions do not explicitly discuss those normative theories,
especially in the context of explicating a BIT’s object and purpose, where
one would expect such a discussion.26 The lack of an explicit reference does
19. See, e.g., infra Section III(a).
20. See infra Section III.
21. See Wintershall AG v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, Award, ¶ 85 (Dec. 8, 2008),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0907.pdf.
22. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31, 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
23. See infra Section III.
24. See, e.g., infra notes 54–66 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., infra notes 195–206, 219–221 and accompanying text; infra Section III(e).
26. Determining the object and purpose of BITs has largely oscillated between two policy goals:
the protection of foreign investors and the economic development of the state parties. On the former, see
José Alvarez & Kathryn Khamsi, The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors: A Glimpse into the Heart
of the Investment Regime, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2008–2009,
at 379, 470–71 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2009); Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the
Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 116 (Jan. 29,
2004), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0782.pdf. On the latter, see Brigitte
Stern, The Future of International Investment Law: A Balance Between the Protection of Investors and
the States’ Capacity to Regulate, in THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME 174, 189–91
(Jose E. Alvarez et al. eds., 2011); Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶
52 (Oct. 12, 2005), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0565.pdf; Saluka Invs.
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not negate the theories’ existence or influence on tribunals’ interpretative
work; it merely keeps it in the dark.
B. The Pluralist Theory of International Investment Law
Among the two preceding conceptions of BITs, thinking of BITs as
contracts concluded by two states in pursuit of their national interest is more
intuitive. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to the ICSID Convention,
which establishes the primary enforcement mechanism of BITs.27 The
emphasis on the will of the state parties to BITs puts sovereignty at the heart
of this theory of international investment law. With sovereignty set as a
baseline, the state parties’ obligations under BITs are viewed as exceptional
restraints, justified only by the dual goal of FDI promotion and protection.
Consequently, tribunals that subscribe to this theory restrictively enforce any
claimed limitation on sovereignty. In the same vein, they place the burden of
proving such limitations on claimants, i.e., foreign investors. To prevail,
claimants must show that the disputed measures of the host state, otherwise
considered a legitimate exercise of sovereignty, violate a specific legal
protection under BITs.
From this contractualist perspective, the substantive similarity of BITs
is a mere coincidence. Every single BIT represents an autonomous deal
between two sovereigns that is completely independent of all other BITs,
even those entered into by the same state party. Accordingly, the existence
of a global “investment regime” is, at best, a metaphor. The substantive
similarity, let alone identity, of BITs is never presumed; it can only be
ascertained through a detailed textual examination of every single BIT. As a
result, constructing common principles under international investment law is
not possible except in a bottom-up fashion. This all leads to the conclusion
that, beyond a lex specialis, BITs embody no universal rules for the
B.V.
(Neth.)
v.
Czech,
Partial
Award,
¶
300
(Perm.
Ct.
Arb.
2006),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0740.pdf. Economic development has also
been proposed as an object and purpose of the ICSID Convention. Fakes v. Republic of Turk., ICSID
Case No. ARB/07/20, Award, ¶ 111 (July 14, 2010), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0314.pdf; Lemire v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Liability, ¶ 237 (Jan. 21, 2010), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0453.pdf.
27. The Tribunal’s rejection of a local NGO’s request to submit an amicus curia in the Aguas del
Tunari case exemplifies this view. The Tribunal opined that these “requests are beyond the power or the
authority of the Tribunal to grant,” pointing out that the “interplay of the two treaties involved (. . . [the
ICSID Convention and the Netherlands-Bolivia BIT]) and the consensual nature of arbitration places the
control of the issues … with the parties, not the Tribunal.” The Tribunal added that “it is manifestly clear
to the Tribunal that it does not, absent the agreement of the Parties, have the power to join a non-party to
the proceedings; to provide access to hearings to non-parties and, a fortiori, to the public generally; or to
make the documents of the proceedings public.” Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bol., ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/03, Letter by NGO to Petition to Participate as Amici Curiae (Jan. 29, 2003),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0019_0.pdf (emphasis added).
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governance of FDI.28
Qua contracts, BITs may include whatever legal provisions the state
parties deem fit. Pluralist tribunals take heed of that; they are willing to
condone varying formulations of the same provision in different BITs.29
Likewise, they operationalize BITs in a way that prioritizes the realization
of the will of the state parties, no matter how idiosyncratic the provisions of
their BIT might be.30 They also set few limits on the defenses the state parties
may assert under the applicable BIT and show little concern for the broader
implications of such a permissive attitude, especially how it makes it harder,
if not impossible, for foreign investors to know ex ante the exact legal
protection they can get under BITs.31
When it comes to deciding cases, pluralist tribunals are largely reluctant
to accept the authority of prior decisions on the same question.32 They assert
that their role is to settle every dispute on a blank slate, regardless of how
other tribunals may have decided similar disputes in the past, or how their
own decisions may affect dispute settlement in the future.33 In other words,
they strictly adhere to the ad hoc character of ISDS and partake in the ISDS
system on a purely case-by-case basis, not with a view to cumulatively
building coherent case law.
To put the pluralist theory of international investment law into action,
pluralist tribunals employ different levels of discretion, depending on the
context. They enforce the provisions of BITs by alternating between
textualist and teleological interpretative strategies, with a general preference
for the former.34 Evidently, textualist interpretation requires less discretion
than teleology.35 It directs tribunals to acquiesce to the language chosen by
28. The disagreement over whether BITs have evolved into customary international law is at its
clearest in the debates over the content the FET standard. See infra Section III(d).
29. See, e.g., infra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., infra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., infra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.
32. For instance, the Tribunal asserted in AES Corp v. Arg. Republic that it is not bound by the
decisions of other tribunals on the same question on the theory that “[a]n identity of the basis of
jurisdiction of these tribunals, even when it meets with very similar if not even identical facts at the origin
of the disputes, does not suffice to apply systematically to the present case positions or solutions already
adopted in these cases.” AES Corp. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, Decision on
Jurisdiction,
¶
30
(Apr.
26,
2005),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0011.pdf. The Tribunal further stated that “[e]ach tribunal remains sovereign and may
retain, as it is confirmed by ICSID practice, a different solution for resolving the same problem.” Id.; see
also Wintershall AG v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, Award, ¶ 194 (Dec. 8, 2008),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0907.pdf.
33. See AES Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, ¶ 30; see also Wintershall AG, ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/14, ¶ 194.
34. See infra Section IV(a).
35. See infra Section IV(a).
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the state parties and to give it the fullest effect possible, even if the
formulation of the applicable BIT provision is in complete dissonance with
that of analogous provisions in other BITs.36 Still, in other situations,
pluralist tribunals use more discretion. Sometimes the enforcement of a BIT
provision necessitates that tribunals devise a new norm.37 Tribunals can
choose between a new subrule, which typifies categorical legal reasoning, or
a standard, applied mainly through a proportionality analysis. Standards are
less restrictive for states than subrules, but they involve more discretion on
the part of tribunals. As will be shown later, pluralist tribunals are generally
in favor of standards.38
Lastly, it should be noted that tribunals with a pluralist sensibility are
not necessarily more sympathetic to host states than foreign investors.
Taking sovereignty as the point of departure of these tribunals’
operationalization of BITs is, by definition, not very investor friendly.
Nevertheless, the willingness of pluralist tribunals to condone doctrinal
differences among BITs, instead of circumventing them, can be more
protective of foreign investors in certain circumstances.39 In other
circumstances, however, lenience with doctrinal differences leads to the
exact opposite outcome.40
C. The Harmonizing Theory of International Investment Law
Alternatively, BITs can be viewed not as contracts but as the means by
which two states opt into the investment regime. Of course, states may
bilaterally agree to create different or unique arrangements. But absent such
an agreement, a BIT is presumed to be part of a global legal system for
investment that complements and guides the interpretation of individual
BITs. Assuming the existence of an investment regime as a baseline implies
36. Deference would usually be the chosen approach whenever the will of the state parties is
enunciated in detail. A good example is the lengthy definition of investment typically found in BITs
discussed in Section III(a).
37. See, e.g., infra Section III(b) (discussing the definition of “discrimination” under the NT
standard).
38. See infra Section IV(a).
39. For example, although the definition of “investment” varies occasionally across BITs, most
definitions are very expansive. Hence, a pluralist approach would be more favorable to foreign investors
if tribunals simply defer to the language of these definitions, without qualifying it with any external
criteria. As will be shown later, this is not the dominant view in ISDS, specifically before ICSID. The
majority of ICSID tribunals set objective criteria for what represents an “investment,” thereby abridging
the legal protection foreign investors would have enjoyed otherwise.
40. This would be the case if certain state parties opt to limit the protection accorded to foreign
investors under a specific BIT provision, such as the FET standard, by using a qualification that does not
exist under other BITs. Unless this qualification is neutralized by arbitral tribunals, the foreign investors
protected by the qualified provision will be at a disadvantage vis-à-vis other foreign investors who receive
more protection under unqualified provisions.
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that sovereignty is, by default, restricted vis-à-vis foreign investors once the
state parties opt into the system. That is why arbitral tribunals of this view
normally place the burden of proof on host states to justify any claimed
violation of the rules of the investment regime.41
Arguing that an investment regime actually exists does not negate the
fact that BITs are bilateral legal instruments. It rather means that more
emphasis should be placed on the fact that, beyond the bilateral form, the
substance of the vast majority of BITs is very similar, if not identical.42 Even
if BITs occasionally vary in substance, they are equipped with two built-in
coordination mechanisms that help equalize the legal protection they afford
to foreign investors.43 The first is the MFN clause, which guarantees that
foreign investors of different nationalities receive the same treatment from
the same host state, while the second is the NT standard, which ensures that
foreign investors are treated by host states as favorably as national
investors.44 In light of this substantive similarity, it is not illogical to entertain
a top-down understanding of the BIT universe as a global legal system.
Harmonizing tribunals are not only concerned with the realization of
the will of the state parties to a BIT. They pay equal, if not more, attention
to the progressive harmonization of the treatment of foreign investors under
international investment law.45 In concrete terms, these tribunals settle
investment disputes according to the facts of each case as well as the text of
the applicable BIT.46 Yet they look at the applicable BIT not in isolation from
other BITs, but as an integral part of the investment regime.47 In their view,

41. See, e.g., infra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., AIG Cap. Partners, Inc. v. Republic of Kaz., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/6, Award, ¶
12.1.1 (Oct. 7, 2003), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3077.pdf
(referring to the convergence of BITs with regard to the standard of compensation); see also infra Section
III(d) (describing how the majority of arbitral tribunals conclude that the constant inclusion of an FET
standard in BITs has given rise to a new universal rule on the treatment of foreign investors in host states).
43. See Stephen W. Schill, Multilateralizing Investment Treaties Through Most-Favored-Nation
Clauses, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 496, 501–04 (2009).
44. See id.
45. Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s Republic of Bangl., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on
Jurisdiction
and
Recommendation
on
Provisional
Measures
(Mar.
21,
2007),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0733.pdf.
46. Id.
47. For instance, the Tribunal in Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangladesh understood its role to be not only
dispute settlement that is based on the facts of the case and the text of the BIT but also the development
of a coherent case law. So, while the Tribunal held that “it is not bound by previous decisions,” it added
that “at the same time, it is of the opinion that it must pay due consideration to earlier decisions of
international tribunals” because “[i]t also believes that, subject to the specifics of a given treaty and of
the circumstances of the actual case, it has a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious development of
investment law and thereby to meet the legitimate expectations of the community of States and investors
towards certainty of the rule of law.” Id. ¶ 67 (emphasis added).
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only through this interpretative strategy can ISDS actualize the ultimate
objective of international investment law, which is to enable all foreign
investors to compete with each other, and with domestic investors, for FDI
opportunities on an equal footing.48 As a result, these tribunals seek to
neutralize the doctrinal variations of BITs as well as the diversity of the
standards host states may apply to domestic and foreign investors, for both
undermine equality among investors.49
When deciding cases, although precedents are not formally recognized
in ISDS, harmonizing tribunals are more willing to abide by prior arbitral
decisions.50 Their voluntary commitment to such a de facto stare decisis
system represents one of their most effective harmonization tools. Of course,
they are sometimes selective about the precedents they commit to; otherwise,
they would lend credence to prior decisions rendered by pluralist tribunals.
But, overall, harmonizing tribunals champion reliance on precedents in
ISDS, especially those that further the harmonization agenda.
Similar to pluralist tribunals, harmonizing tribunals pragmatically use
discretion in ISDS. Sometimes, deference to the text, rather than teleology,
provides the best means to bring about harmonization. This is the case where
the relevant BIT provision is drafted in a way that renders harmonized
interpretations more plausible. At other times, analogous provisions in
different BITs are so diverse that they inhibit the development of consistent
jurisprudence. In those situations, harmonizing tribunals rely on teleological
48. See, e.g., infra notes 111–113 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., infra notes 111–113 and accompanying text.
50. The Tribunal’s view in Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangl. on the role of precedents in investment
arbitration was adopted by many tribunals. See, e.g., Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v.
Islamic Republic of Pak., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Award, ¶ 145 (Aug. 27, 2009),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0075.pdf; KT Asia Inv. Grp. B.V. v.
Republic of Kaz., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/8, Award, ¶ 83 (Oct. 17, 2013),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3006.pdf; Planet Mining Pty Ltd. v.
Republic of Indon., ICSID Case No. ARB/12/14 and 12/40, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 85 (Feb. 24, 2014),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3104.pdf; Levy v. Republic of Peru,
ICSID Case No. ARB/11/17, Award, ¶ 76 (Jan. 9, 2015), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw4105.pdf; Burlington Res. Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5,
Decision
on
Reconsideration
and
Award,
¶
64
(Feb.
7,
2017),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw8208_0.pdf. Some tribunals suggest
that arbitrators should abide by prior decisions “whenever a clear case law can be discerned.” Impregilo
S.p.A. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award, ¶ 108 (June 21, 2011),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0418.pdf. Other tribunals call on
arbitrators to take prior decisions into account “as far as possible.” Republic of Ecuador v. U.S., PCA
Case No. 2012-5, Award, ¶ 188 (Sept. 29, 2012), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw7940.pdf. A more restrictive view qualifies the relevance of prior decisions by “the
degree to which a clear “jurisprudence constante” has emerged in respect of a particular legal issue.”
Daimler Fin. Servs. AG v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award, ¶ 52 (Aug. 22, 2012),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1082.pdf.
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interpretation to overcome doctrinal discrepancies. When devising a new
norm is required for the operationalization of a BIT provision, harmonizing
tribunals are in favor of subrules rather than standards and are more
committed to categorical reasoning than balancing.51
Lastly, as was pointed out earlier with respect to the pluralist theory,
subscribing to the harmonizing theory does not necessarily amount to
granting foreign investors better treatment across the board. While
harmonization is generally investment-friendly because it levels the playing
field among all investors, both foreign and domestic, it might occasionally
make investors of a specific nationality worse off. This happens when
harmonization decreases the more favorable treatment those investors would
have enjoyed under the more protective BITs signed by their home states.52
But the opposite can also be true if more protective BITs are set as the
benchmark for harmonization. In this case, harmonizing tribunals ratchet up
the overall level of legal protection for all foreign investors.53
III. THE MAIN JURISPRUDENTIAL DIVIDES IN INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION
This section addresses the jurisprudential divides over the five main
provisions of BITs in investment arbitration. The case law shows that
tribunals disagree over the definition of investment; the determination of
“discrimination” under the NT standard; the delimitation of the scope of the
MFN clause; the content of the FET standard; and the distinction between
legitimate, non-compensable regulation and indirect expropriation. This
section analyzes the preceding divides against the backdrop of the opposition
between the pluralist and harmonizing theories of international investment
law. It also specifies which of the two theories has shaped the dominant
interpretation of each of the five provisions.
A. The Definition of Investment
The controversy over the definition of investment in BITs arose in cases
in which respondents, i.e., host states, challenged the jurisdiction of arbitral
tribunals formed under the ICSID Convention.54 In those cases, respondents
asserted that ICSID tribunals lacked subject-matter jurisdiction on the
grounds that the foreign investors’ claims do not arise out of an “investment”
51. See infra Section IV(a).
52. See, e.g., infra Section III(a) (on the harmonization of the definition of “investment”).
53. See, e.g., infra Section III (discussing the extension of the MFN treatment to ISDS).
54. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States art. 25, Oct. 14, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
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under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, even if the financial undertakings
of the foreign investors represent an investment under the BIT.55 Therefore,
ICSID tribunals had to answer the following question: what role should the
definition of investment in a BIT play in the determination of a tribunal’s
jurisdiction? Assuming that ICSID is elected as the ISDS forum in a BIT, is
it sufficient that a financial undertaking meets the definitional requirements
of investment under the BIT in order for an ICSID tribunal to have
jurisdiction, or should that financial undertaking also be an investment under
the ICSID Convention?
Notably, Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, which delimits the
subject-matter jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals, does not define the term
“investment.” BITs, on the contrary, typically include a detailed description
of the financial undertakings the state parties consider an investment. While
definitions in BITs are largely similar, some variation can still be seen. A
distinction is usually made between enterprise-based and asset-based
definitions. The former is more influenced by the conventional economic
model of FDI, which excludes portfolio investment and real estate.56 The
latter, which is more common in modern BITs, is less committed to the
economic model of FDI; hence, it includes financial undertakings such as
portfolio investment and intangible assets.57 Some BITs qualify the
definition of investment by adding a requirement of “lasting economic
relations.”58 Likewise, several developing countries qualify the definition of
investment in their recent Model BITs with additional requirements derived
from investment arbitration case law.59
Should the definition of investment under BITs be dispositive, the
parties to a BIT would be the final arbiters of the scope of the subject-matter
jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals, making it impossible to reach a universal
55. Id.; see also, e.g., Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision of
the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 18–19 (July 11, 1997), 37 I.L.M. 1378 (1998).
56. OECD, Negotiating Group on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), Definition of
Investor and Investment (Note by the Chairman), at 2, DAFFE/MAI(95)2 (Oct. 13, 1995).
57. For an example, see 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 1, 2012,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf; Agreement Between
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Czech-U.K., art.
1(a), July 10, 1990, GR. BRIT. T.S. No. 42 (1993) (Cm. 3528); Agreement on Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of
Venezuela, Neth.-Venez., art. 1(a), Oct. 22, 1991, Trb. 1991, 172 (Neth.).
58. Agreement Between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Kingdom of
Denmark Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Den.-Ukr., art. 1(1), Oct.
23,
1992,
http://arbitration.kiev.ua/Uploads/Admin/%D0%94%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%96%
D1%8F%20ENGL_compressed.pdf.
59. Grant Hanessian & Kabir Duggal, The Final 2015 Indian Model BIT: Is This the Change the
World Wishes to See?, 32 ICSID REV. 216, 217–18 (2017).
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determination of such a scope. Given the above-mentioned discrepancies in
the definitions of investment in different BITs, jurisdiction would only be
determined on a case-by-case basis. If, however, the final determination is
made by reference to the ICSID Convention, ICSID tribunals can circumvent
the definitional variation among BITs, thereby stabilizing the scope of their
own subject-matter jurisdiction. Under the latter approach, no matter how
the parties to a BIT may define investment, the BIT definition would not be
enforced except within the confines specified by ICSID tribunals under
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention—a test known as the “double keyhole
approach.”60
On its own, the legal material cannot fully explain the different answers
given by ICSID tribunals to this question. The ordinary meaning of
“investment” under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention does not favor any
specific definition. Moreover, having recourse to the travaux préparatoires
of the ICSID Convention, as prescribed by Article 32 of the VCLT, provides
no definitive answer since they lead in opposite directions. Some tribunals
cite the Report of the Executive Directors on the ICSID Convention dated
August 6, 1964, which was adopted by the Board of Governors of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on September 10,
1964.61 The Report provides that “no attempt was made to define the term
‘investment’ given the essential requirement of consent by the parties, and
the mechanism through which Contracting States can make known in
advance, if they so desire, the classes of disputes which they would or would
not consider submitting to the Centre.”62
Interestingly, the same Report lends support to the opposite view.
Despite its recognition of the absence of a definition of investment in the
ICSID Convention, the Report states that “while consent of the parties is an
60. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
84 (3d ed. 2022). Tribunals also call it the “double barrel approach.” See Deutsche Bank AG v.
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/02, Award, ¶ 293 (Oct. 31, 2012),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1272.pdf; Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v.
Republic of Bol., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 278 (Oct. 21,
2005),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C210/DC629_En.pdf
(referring to this test as a “jurisdictional keyhole”).
61. ICSID, Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 1965, 1 ICSID REP. 23, ¶ 27 (1993) [hereinafter
Report of the Executive Directors]. A similar statement is made in the Report of the Chairman of the
Legal Committee on Settlement of Investment Disputes, which indicates that the majority of countries
preferred not to define the term “investment” under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. ICSID, Report
of the Chairman of the Legal Committee on Settlement of Investment Disputes (Dec. 23, 1964), reprinted
in 2 HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION 934, 936 (2012) [hereinafter Report of the Chairman].
62. Report of the Executive Directors, supra note 61, ¶ 27. A similar statement is made in the Report
of the Chairman, which indicates that the majority of countries preferred not to define the term
“investment” under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. Report of the Chairman, supra note 61, at 936.
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essential prerequisite for the jurisdiction of the Centre, consent alone will not
suffice to bring a dispute within its jurisdiction,” adding that “the jurisdiction
of the Centre is further limited by reference to the nature of the dispute and
the parties thereto.”63 This statement is corroborated by the remarks of Aron
Broches, the then-General Counsel of the Bank and the main driving force
behind the ICSID Convention.64 According to Broches, while the signatories
of the ICSID Convention did not agree on a definition of investment under
Article 25, “an investment was in fact readily recognizable.”65 Broches later
reiterated the same view in an article published in 1966.66
Based on the foregoing, a minority of tribunals took for granted the fact
that the drafters of the ICSID Convention did not adopt any formal definition
of investment and thus declined to construct one under Article 25.67 Faced
with diverse BIT definitions of investment, these tribunals simply deferred
to the will of the state parties, preferring “a more flexible and pragmatic
approach,” although with occasional limits on the parties’ will in light of “the
circumstances of the case, including the nature of the instrument containing
the relevant consent to ICSID.”68 Apart from these infrequent limitations,
tribunals in this camp emphasized the contractual nature of both the ICSID
Convention and BITs. They considered the BIT definition of investment the
sole foundation of their subject-matter jurisdiction,69 and, as a corollary, their
63. Report of the Executive Directors, supra note 61, ¶ 25.
64. ICSID, Memorandum of the Meeting of the Committee of the Whole, February 16, 1965,
Discussion of Chapters I and II of the Draft Convention (Feb. 17, 1965), reprinted in 2 HISTORY OF THE
ICSID CONVENTION 965, 972 (2012).
65. Id.
66. Aron Broches, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes: Some Observations on
Jurisdiction, 5 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 263, 268 (1966) (“During the negotiations several definitions
of ‘investment’ were considered and rejected. It was felt in the end that a definition could be dispensed
with ‘given the essential requirement of consent by the parties’ . . . [p]resumably, the parties’ agreement
that a dispute is an ‘investment dispute’ will be given great weight in any determination of the Centre’s
jurisdiction, although it would not be controlling.”) (emphasis added).
67. Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, ¶¶ 310–
315
(July
24,
2008),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/
OnlineAwards/C67/DC1589_En.pdf.
68. Id. ¶ 316.
69. See, e.g., AIG Cap. Partners, Inc. v. Republic of Kaz., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/6, Award, ¶
9.3.3 (Oct. 7, 2003), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3077.pdf (holding
that “the jurisdiction of ICSID under Article 25 of the Convention is based directly on the BIT concluded
between the host State . . . and the State of the investors”); Malaysian Hist. Salvors Sdn., Bhd. v. Gov’t
of Malay., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Application for Annulment, ¶¶ 57–80 (Apr. 16, 2009),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C247/DC1030_En.pdf (finding that
the jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals should be determined by “the definition of investment agreed by the
Parties in the instrument providing for recourse to ICSID” as per the travaux préparatoires and the
Executive Directors’ interpretation of the ICSID Convention); Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Eng’rs v.
Republic of Alb., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21, Award, ¶¶ 36–48 (July 30, 2009),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C113/DC1133_En.pdf (recognizing
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determinations were made on a case-by-case basis.70
The abovementioned minority position clearly manifests a commitment
to the pluralist theory of international investment law. By viewing both the
ICSID Convention and BITs as contracts, tribunals prioritized the realization
of the will of the state parties to BITs, no matter how inconsistent their
chosen definition might be with other definitions. The trade-off, however,
was to sacrifice the prospects for an objective determination of the subjectmatter jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals—the primary ISDS forum
worldwide—and to cede the goal of providing all foreign investors with
access to this forum on an equal footing. To put this pluralist view into
action, tribunals resorted to a textualist interpretation of both the ICSID
Convention and BITs. They undisputedly accepted the absence of a formal
definition of investment under the ICSID Convention, while adhering strictly
to the definitions provided for in BITs.
In contrast to the previous approach, the majority of ICSID tribunals

that the word “investment” is ambiguous and must be interpreted on a case-by-case basis); Inmaris
Perestroika Sailing Mar. Servs. GmbH v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶
126–134
(Mar.
8,
2010),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C320/DC1490_En.pdf (holding that
“it will be appropriate to defer to the State parties’ articulation in the instrument of consent . . . of what
constitutes an investment”); Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16, Award,
¶¶
310–316
(Nov.
8,
2010),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C108/DC1751_En.pdf (maintaining
that the objective approach to the definition of investment, known as the Salini test, is not binding and
that deference to the parties’ definition of investment in BITs should be the rule, unless the “tribunal
would have to have very strong reasons to hold that the States’ mutually agreed definition of investment
should be set aside”); Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9, Jurisdiction
and
Admissibility,
¶¶
475–481
(Feb.
8,
2013),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C340/DC2992_En.pdf (rejecting the
view that the Salini criteria constitute “mandatory prerequisites for the jurisdiction of the Centre” but
accepting them as “guidelines”); Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Servs. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil.,
ICSID
Case
No.
ARB/11/12,
Award,
¶
297
(Dec.
10,
2014),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4114.pdf (“In the absence of any
definition of ‘investment’ under the ICSID Convention, the BIT and international law, as the law
governing the BIT, assume relevance to establish jurisdiction ratione materiae.”); Garanti Koza LLP v.
Turkm., ICSID Case No. ARB/11/20, Award, ¶¶ 235–242 (Dec. 19, 2016),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C1700/DC9872_En.pdf (holding that
the BIT definition of “investment” is dispositive as long as “ nothing about that definition or the
Claimant’s investment itself exceeds what is permissible under the ICSID Convention or is incompatible
with its purpose”); Kim v. Republic of Uzb., ICSID Case No. ARB/13/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶
323–330 (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw8549.pdf
(rejecting the argument that “there is a restrictive test to be applied to the definition of ‘investments’ in
the BIT”).
70. The Tribunal in Pantechniki thus concluded that its task is not “to make general pronouncements
about an emerging synthesis intended to resolve all controversies” but only “to determine whether in this
case there was an investment that satisfied both the Treaty and the ICSID Convention.” Pantechniki,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21, ¶ 47.
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were in favor of an objective determination of their subject-matter
jurisdiction. To overcome the varying definitions of investment in BITs,
tribunals came up with an autonomous definition of investment under Article
25 of the ICSID Convention and insisted that financial undertakings must
meet the double keyhole test as a precondition for an ICSID tribunal to have
jurisdiction.71 Constructing a definition of investment under the ICSID
Convention began in 1997 with the Tribunal in Fedax making the first
reference to the “objective” criteria a tribunal should consider in order to
conclude that an investment exists under Article 25.72 The criteria were
derived from the first edition of Schreuer’s commentary on the ICSID
Convention in which he noted some of the typical characteristics of the
financial undertakings that were deemed investments by arbitral tribunals.73
Four years later, the Tribunal in Salini deployed Schreuer’s list as
jurisdictional requirements that must be met in order for an ICSID tribunal
to have subject-matter jurisdiction.74 According to what became widely
known as the “Salini test,” an investment must be comprised of a substantial
undertaking, last for a certain duration, involve an assumption of risk, and
contribute to the development of the host state.75 Many subsequent decisions
relied on the Salini test, though with some variation.76 The common
71. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 60, at 84. Tribunals also call it the “double barrel approach.”
See, e.g., Deutsche Bank AG v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/02,
Award,
¶
293
(Oct.
31,
2012),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw1272.pdf; see also Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bol., ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/3,
Respondent’s
Objections
to
Jurisdiction,
¶
278
(Oct.
21,
2005),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C210/DC629_En.pdf (referring to
this test as a “jurisdictional keyhole”).
72. Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision of the Tribunal on
Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 43 (July 11, 1997), 37 I.L.M. 1378 (1998); see also Ceskoslovenska
Obchodní Banka, A.S. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 68
(May
24,
1999),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C160/DC556_En.pdf (holding that an
investment under Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention “is objective in nature in that the parties may
agree on a more precise or restrictive definition of their acceptance of the Centre’s jurisdiction, but they
may not choose to submit disputes to the Centre that are not related to an investment”).
73. CHRISTOPHER H. SCHREUER, ICSID CONVENTION COMMENTARY, art. 25, ¶ 122 (1st ed. 2001)
(pointing out, nevertheless, that “these features should not necessarily be understood as jurisdictional
requirements but merely as typical characteristics of investments under the Convention”).
74. Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 50–52 (July 16, 2001), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0738.pdf.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Dem. Rep. Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on the Application
for Annulment of the Award, ¶ 31 (Nov. 1, 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0537.pdf (opining that “the parties to an agreement and the States which conclude an
investment treaty cannot open the jurisdiction of the Centre to any operation they might arbitrarily qualify
as an investment,” adding that “before ICSID arbitral tribunals, the Washington Convention has
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denominator among those decisions was the view that in order for an ICSID
tribunal to have jurisdiction, the financial undertaking out of which the
dispute arises has to meet the definitional requirements provided for in the
relevant BIT as well as the objective definition of investment constructed
under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention.
Tribunals within this group, representing the majority in the case law,
embraced the harmonizing theory of international investment law. They did
not view the thousands of BITs currently in force as independent contracts,
but rather as building blocks of a global investment regime. Under this
regime, the boundless diversity of the definitions of investment in BITs was
disfavored. Consistency was sought, and achieved, through the backdoor of
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. To this end, harmonizing tribunals
opted for a teleological interpretation of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention,
which eventually led to the formation of objective jurisdictional
requirements under the ICSID Convention.77
From a positivist legalist perspective, the harmonizing approach to the
definition of investment can be considered either legitimate gap-filling under
the ICSID Convention or, conversely, an unwarranted encroachment on the
supremacy over an agreement between the parties or a BIT”); Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech, ICSID Case
No.
ARB/06/5,
Award,
¶
96
(Apr.
15,
2009),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C74/DC1033_En.pdf (adopting the
exact same view of the Mitchell tribunal); Fakes v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20,
Award,
¶¶
107–114
(July
14,
2010),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0314.pdf (limiting the criteria of investment to (i) a contribution, (ii) a certain duration, and
(iii) an element of risk); GEA Grp. AG v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16, Award, ¶¶ 137–143, 151–
164
(Mar.
31,
2011),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/
C440/DC3408_En.pdf (providing no conclusive opinion on the relationship between Article 25 of the
ICSID Convention and the definition of investment in BITs but, “out of an abundance of caution,” opting
to ascertain that the claimed investment met the requirements of contribution, duration, and risk);
Deutsche Bank AG, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/02, ¶¶ 293–297 (rejecting Salini in principle but,
nonetheless, adopting three objective criteria to define investment: contribution, risk, and duration);
Electrabel S.A. v. Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and
Liability, ¶¶ 5.43–5.45 (Nov. 30, 2012), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/
OnlineAwards/C111/DC2853_En.pdf (accepting Salini’s criteria except for the requirement of
contribution to the development of the host state); KT Asia Inv. Grp. B.V. v. Republic of Kaz., ICSID
Case
No.
ARB/09/8,
Award,
¶
165
(Oct.
17,
2013),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C620/DC3912_En.pdf (holding that
the ordinary meaning of investment is objective and “inherent to the word “investment”“); Anglia Auto
Accessories Ltd. v. Czech, SCC Case No. V2014/181, Final Award, ¶ 150 (Mar. 10, 2017),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw8556.pdf (recognizing the Salini test
but asserting that it is not applicable because the arbitration “was brought under the SCC Arbitration
Rules, not the ICSID Arbitration Rules”).
77. In the second edition of his commentary on the ICSID Convention, Schreuer repudiated the
Salini test. He lamented the transformation of what was supposed to be a mere description of “investment”
in the first edition of the commentary into objective jurisdictional requirements that must be met in order
for an ICSID tribunal to have subject-matter jurisdiction. CHRISTOPHER H. SCHREUER, ICSID
CONVENTION COMMENTARY art. 25, ¶¶ 133 (2d ed. 2009).
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sovereignty of the state parties to both BITs and the ICSID Convention.78
But regardless of the view adopted, employing such an activist agenda was,
in reality, the means by which harmonizing tribunals managed to unify the
diverse definitions of investment in thousands of BITs, making it possible
for almost all foreign investors to have access to ICSID under nearly the
same conditions.
B. The National Treatment Standard
The NT standard protects foreign investors against discrimination by a
host state that aims to benefit national investors.79 NT is violated whenever
foreign investors are treated less favorably than national investors, as long
as both are in like circumstances or situations.80 The operationalization of
the standard requires arbitral tribunals to examine (1) if foreign investors
received a specific “treatment” from the host state; (2) if the treatment was
discriminatory in the sense of differentiating between foreign and national
investors; and (3) if both foreign and national investors were in like
circumstances or situations.
Two different methods exist in the case law for the enforcement of the
second prong, i.e., the determination of whether the treatment of foreign
investors was discriminatory. The first method requires a showing that the
disputed measures of the host state were actually intended to discriminate
against foreign investors. Alternatively, discrimination can be established by
analyzing the adverse effects of the disputed measures on foreign investors
vis-à-vis national investors. Should the host state’s measures
disproportionately affect foreign investors, a conclusion can be drawn that
the measures are discriminatory.
The choice between the two methods gave rise to the main
jurisprudential divide over the NT standard. The language of the standard
alone is insufficient to explain tribunals’ choices since the rules of treaty
interpretation under the VCLT support both methods. A better insight into
the divide can be offered by the opposition between the pluralist and
harmonizing theories of international investment law. However, the
78. Besides the sovereignty critique, the advocates of the pluralist approach claim that the objective
criteria of investment are very rigid in light of the various forms investment may take. See id. ¶¶ 130–
131.
79. However, as will be discussed later, most tribunals share the view that discrimination can occur
even if a host state has no intent to grant its national investors an advantage over foreign investors.
80. See, e.g., 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 3, 2004,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/U.S.%20model%20BIT.pdf; 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty art. 3, 2012, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf;
see also North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) art. 1102(1), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
[hereinafter NAFTA].
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dichotomy between pluralism and harmonization in relation to the NT
standard is peculiar because the NT standard seeks to level the playing field
between foreign and national investors. Accordingly, regulatory pluralism or
harmonization in this context pertains not to the variation of BITs but that of
the standards applied to foreign and national investors by a specific host
state.
Few examples can be found in the case law where arbitral tribunals
relied on the host state’s intent to find discrimination.81 In these cases, no
violation of the NT standard was found, irrespective of the harm inflicted
upon the foreign investor, because the host state did not actually intend to
either discriminate or exclusively benefit its national investors.82 Tribunals
reached the same conclusion upon the foreign investor’s failure to prove the
host state’s discriminatory intent, even if that intent had existed as a matter
of fact.83
Arguably, a pluralist sensibility can be discerned in the intent test for
discriminatory treatment. On the one hand, the reliance on intent reflects a
view of international investment law as a contract-based system under which
any claimed limitation on the sovereignty of the state parties to BITs is
restrictively enforced. Therefore, the burden of proof is placed on foreign
investors, which gives host states more leeway with their regulations, as long
as no discriminatory intent can be shown.
On the other hand, the intent test requires tribunals to evaluate the
legality of host states’ regulatory goals. But given the impossibility of
defining legal and illegal goals a priori, no objective determination of
discrimination can be made under the intent test. Instead, discrimination can
be found only on a case-by-case basis through a balancing or proportionality
test, which requires an expansive use of discretion. A foreign investor’s
treatment would ultimately depend on the regulatory context, the investor’s
ability to prove the host state’s discriminatory intent, and the tribunal’s
81. GAMI Inv., Inc. v. Gov’t of the United Mexican States, NAFTA Arb. Trib., Final Award, ¶¶
112–115 (Reisman, Muró, Paulsson, Arbs. 2004), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0353_0.pdf. The Tribunal noted that “the Government may have been clumsy in its analysis
of the relevant criteria for the cutoff line between candidates and non-candidates for expropriation” and
that the government’s “understanding of corporate finance may have been deficient.” However, the
Tribunal eventually held that “ineffectiveness is not discrimination” and that “the arbitrators are satisfied
that a reason exists for the measure which was not itself discriminatory.” Id. ¶ 114 (emphasis added).
82. Id. ¶¶ 112–115.
83. Genin v. Republic of Est., ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award, ¶¶ 368–369 (June 25, 2000),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C178/DC592_En.pdf. In Methanex,
the Tribunal mainly focused on the third prong of the NT standard, i.e., likeness, but in relation to the
discrimination requirement, the Tribunal stated in passing that the claimant must prove that “California
intended to favour domestic investors.” Methanex Corp. v. U.S., ICSID, Final Award, ¶¶ 12, 38 (Aug. 3,
2005), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0529.pdf (emphasis added).
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approval or disapproval of the host state’s regulatory goals. The flexibility
of the test, however, comes at the cost of rendering the NT standard less
certain, as it would be very hard for foreign investors to ascertain the exact
treatment they would receive under the standard ex-ante—an outcome that
perfectly aligns with regulatory diversity or pluralism.
Perhaps for those reasons, the majority of arbitral tribunals sided with
the objective determination of discriminatory treatment.84 They solely
focused on the adverse effects on foreign investors, while completely
ignoring the intent of host states.85 Discrimination was found whenever the
host state’s measure placed a foreign investor in a disproportionately
disadvantaged position vis-à-vis national investors.86 Tribunals justified their
preference for the effects test by the high burden of proof the intent test
places on foreign investors as well as the difficulty of assessing the legality
of the rationales for host states’ measures.87
The operationalization of the NT standard through the effects test
bespeaks a commitment to the harmonizing theory of international
84. Archer Daniels provides a very rare example in which a tribunal adopted a mixed approach that
combined both the subjective and objective tests for discrimination. Archer Daniels Midland Co. v.
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/5, Award, ¶¶ 209–213 (Nov. 21, 2007),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C43/DC782_En.pdf.
85. Decisions in this large group of cases include S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA Arb.
Trib.,
Partial
Award,
¶¶
252–256
(Schwartz,
Chiasson,
Hunter,
Arbs.
2000),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0747.pdf (maintaining that the existence of
a “protectionist intent is not necessarily decisive on its own” and that “the word “treatment” suggests that
practical impact is required to produce a breach of Article 1102, not merely a motive or intent that is in
violation of Chapter 11”); Feldman v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award,
¶¶ 181–184 (Dec. 16, 2002), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0319.pdf;
Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3467, Final Award, ¶
177 (July 1, 2004), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0571.pdf; Int’l
Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, NAFTA Arb. Trib., Arbitral Award, ¶ 177 (Ariosa,
W. . .lde, Berg, Arbs. 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0431.pdf;
Siemens AG v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶¶ 320–321 (Feb. 6, 2007),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C3004/CLA-050_Eng.pdf;
Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lith., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, ¶¶ 367–368 (Sept.
11, 2007), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C252/DC682_En.pdf;
Corn Prods. Int’l v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01, Decision on Responsibility,
¶
138
(Jan.
15,
2008),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C29/DC1012_En.pdf;
Bayindir
Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pak., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Award,
¶ 390 (Aug. 27, 2009), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0075.pdf (opining
that discrimination is found using an objective rather than a subjective test and, accordingly, considering
the intent to discriminate completely irrelevant to its conclusion); Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v. Gov’t
of
Can.,
ICSID
Case
No.
UNCT/07/1,
Award,
¶
80
(Mar.
31,
2010),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0504.pdf.
86. Corn Prods. Int’l, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01, ¶ 138 (holding that the fact that the adverse
effects of the disputed tax were felt only by the foreign investor is sufficient to establish discrimination).
87. Feldman, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, ¶ 183.
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investment law. The test presumes that foreign and national investors, by
default, would be equal within host states. Such a premise runs in stark
contrast to the traditional rules of international law under which host states
are not obliged to accord foreigners the same treatment as nationals. It also
contradicts the contractualist view of BITs, which supports a restrictive
enforcement of any limitation on host states’ power to discriminate. The
tribunals that rely on the effects test not only prohibit discrimination but also
insist on almost complete harmonization of the treatment granted to foreign
and national investors.
Tribunals in this group operationalize the NT standard by devising an
inflexible subrule rather than a standard. The subrule basically prohibits any
differentiation in treatment between foreign and national investors, unless
justified by host states. The inflexibility of the subrule allows tribunals to
operationalize the NT standard with very little discretion since they largely
spare themselves the need to evaluate the validity of host states’ regulatory
goals. This way, they provide foreign investors with more ex-ante certainty
about the expected treatment under the NT standard. But, of course, this
renders the NT standard more rigid and less sensitive to the peculiarities of
the domestic regulatory context of host states.
C. The Most-Favored-Nation Clause
The MFN clause requires a state party to a BIT to treat the investors of
the other state party no less favorably than the investors of any third party.
This way, the MFN clause levels the playing field among different foreign
investors within the same host state, even if their investments fall under the
umbrella of different BITs. The BIT that gives foreign investors direct
protection in the host state and allows them to “import” more favorable
treatment from other BITs through the MFN clause is called the “basic
treaty.”88 By contrast, the BIT that provides the more favorable treatment to
other foreign investors is known as the “comparator treaty.”89
The formulation of the MFN clause varies widely in BITs. Many BITs
use sweeping language that covers “all matters” subject to the BIT.90 Other
BITs qualify the MFN clause by limiting it to particular aspects of FDI, such
as the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, or disposal of the

88. Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Objections to
Jurisdiction, ¶ 44 (Jan. 25, 2000), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0479.pdf
89. Daimler Fin. Servs. AG v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award, ¶ 157 (Aug. 22,
2012), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1082.pdf.
90. See Agreement Between the Argentine Republic and the Kingdom of Spain on the Reciprocal
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Arg.-Spain, art. 4-2, Oct. 3, 1991, 1537 U.N.T.S. 2681.
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investment.91 A third group of BITs carve out certain exceptions from the
MFN treatment, including, for instance, the more favorable treatment the
host state grants to foreign investors from specific countries because of the
host state’s membership in “[a] free trade area; [a] customs union; [a]
common market; [a] regional integration agreement; or [a]n organization of
mutual economic assistance.”92 Occasionally, BITs explicitly specify the
scope of the MFN clause. This is exemplified by the U.K. Model BIT, which
enumerates, “for the avoidance of doubt,” the BIT provisions subject to the
MFN treatment.93 Lastly, some states attach to their BITs additional
protocols, which particularly keep ISDS out of the ambit of the MFN
clause.94
Logically, the operationalization of the MFN clause requires the
definition of its scope. In a number of cases, foreign investors claimed that
they were entitled to not only the more favorable substantive treatment
stipulated in the other BITs signed by the host state, but also the more
favorable procedural treatment, especially that pertaining to ISDS.95
Specifically, investors maintained that, absent an explicit provision to the
contrary in the basic treaty, they should benefit from the provisions that
either establish investment arbitration as an ISDS mechanism or make
investment arbitration available under less stringent admissibility
requirements.96 Host states responded to such claims with admissibility and
jurisdictional challenges, calling upon tribunals to define the scope of the
“more favorable treatment” foreign investors can invoke.97 Answering this
question caused one of the most divisive jurisprudential divides in the field
by far.98
91. Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Argentina for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Arg.-U.K., art. 3-2, Dec. 11, 1990, 1765 U.N.T.S. 30682.
92. Agreement Between the Argentine Republic and the Kingdom of Spain on the Reciprocal
Promotion and Protection of Investments, supra note 90, art. 4-3.
93. U.K. Model BIT art. 3-3, 2005, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investmentagreements/treaty-files/2847/download.
94. Agreement Between the Republic of Colombia and the Swiss Confederation on the Reciprocal
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Colom.-Switz., art. 4-2, May 17, 2006,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/803/download.
95. See, e.g., Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Objections
to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 40–44 (Jan. 25, 2000), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0479.pdf.
96. Id.
97. Id. ¶¶ 20–21.
98. Daimler Fin. Servs. AG v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award, ¶ 52 (Aug. 22,
2012), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1082.pdf; Garanti Koza LLP v.
Turkm., ICSID Case No. ARB/11/20, Decision on the Objection to Jurisdiction for Lack of Consent, ¶¶
40–41
(July
3,
2013),
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The conventional rules of treaty interpretation did not lead arbitral
tribunals to any decisive conclusion as to whether the MFN clause should
apply to ISDS.99 Tribunals noted the futility of appealing to the “context” of
BITs, as commanded by Article 31 of the VCLT, which involves an
examination of the BITs that the state parties concluded with third parties.100
This is because the other BITs say nothing about what the state parties
actually intended in the applicable BIT.101 Furthermore, the treaty practice
of most states is too diverse to warrant any conclusion about a systematic
policy with regard to the scope of the MFN clause.102
In the same vein, consulting the decisions of international courts in
similar cases as secondary sources of public international law offered no
definitive answers. Typically, the proponents of a restrictive interpretation
of the MFN clause, which confines it to the substantive provisions in the
basic treaty to the exclusion of ISDS altogether, cite the decision of the
International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case. In this
case, the Court coined a famous doctrine, which came to be known later as
the ejusdem generis rule.103 Under this rule, a beneficiary from the MFN
clause remains completely foreign to, and thus cannot benefit from, all the
provisions in the comparator treaty that deal with questions not covered in
the basic treaty.104
Conversely, the advocates of an expansive interpretation of the MFN
clause that makes no distinction between substantive and procedural
provisions refer to the decision of the arbitral Commission in the Ambatielos
case. The Ambatielos Commission vindicated Greece’s claim that the MFN
clause in its 1886 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with the
United Kingdom allowed it to invoke the provisions on the administration of
justice in the analogous treaties concluded by the United Kingdom with third
parties.105 Interestingly, the Commission also cited the ejusdem generis rule
as the basis of its conclusion.106
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C1700/DC3632_En.pdf.
99. See Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 188–197 (Feb. 8, 2005), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0669.pdf (deciding the case by inferring an intent on the part of the state parties to not
extend the MFN clause to dispute settlement).
100. See id. ¶¶ 195–197.
101. Id. ¶ 195.
102. See Nat’l Grid P.L.C. v. Arg. Republic, BIT Arb. Trib., Award, ¶¶ 146–153 (Garro, Kessler,
Sureda, Arbs. 2008), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0555.pdf.
103. See Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (U.K. v. Iran), Judgment, 1952 I.C.J. Rep. 93, 109 (July 22).
104. Id.
105. Ambatielos Claim (Greece, U.K. and N. Ir.), Award, at 107 (U.N. Int’l Trib. 1956),
https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XII/83-153_Ambatielos.pdf.
106. The Commission held: “It is true that the ‘administration of justice’, when viewed in isolation,
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Against the backdrop of this interpretative divide, arbitral tribunals
bifurcated into two camps, exemplifying the opposition between the pluralist
and harmonizing theories of international investment law at its clearest.107
Following the landmark decision in Maffezini, many tribunals treated
substantive and procedural BIT provisions, including ISDS provisions, alike
for the purposes of the MFN clause.108 To reach this conclusion, tribunals
is a subject-matter other than ‘commerce and navigation’, but this is not necessarily so when it is viewed
in connection with the protection of the rights of traders… [t]herefore it cannot be said that the
administration of justice, in so far as it is concerned with the protection of these rights, must necessarily
be excluded from the field of application of the most-favored-nation clause, when the latter includes ‘all
matters relating to commerce and navigation.’” Id. at 107.
107. Of course, it could be argued that the difference between the two views can be explained by
factual factors, such as the nature of the foreign investors’ claims or the language of the applicable MFN
clause. While this might be true, what makes the divide genuinely normative, rather than merely factual,
is that tribunals in both groups were keen on reaching universal conclusions about the scope of the MFN
clause that were not limited to the dispute at hand. The Tribunal in ST-AD GmbH thus remarked that the
disagreement among tribunals in this regard does not only result from the doctrinal variation of BITs, but
also from normative differences among tribunals about the proper scope of the MFN clause. See ST-AD
GmbH v. Republic of Bulg., Award on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 387–388 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2013),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3113.pdf; DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra
note 60 at 2734.
108. This line of cases began in 2000 with Maffezini and was followed by many other tribunals. See
Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction, ¶¶
38–64
(Jan.
25,
2000),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C163/DC565_En.pdf;
Técnicas
Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, ¶
69–74
(May
29,
2003),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/icsidblobs/onlineawards/C3785/DC4873_en.pdf; MTD Equity Sdn.
Bhd. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, ¶¶ 100–104 (May 25, 2004),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0544.pdf; Siemens AG v. Arg. Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 108–110 (Aug. 3, 2004),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0788.pdf; Camuzzi Int’l S.A. v. Arg.
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/7, Decisión del Tribunal de Arbitraje sobre Excepciones a la
Jurisdicción [Decision on Exceptions to Jurisdiction], ¶¶ 16–17 (June 10, 2005),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0110.pdf; Gas Nat. SDG, S.A. v. Arg.
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, Decision on Preliminary Questions on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 29–31, 41–
49 (June 17, 2005), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0354.pdf; Telefónica
S.A v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/20, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 101–108
(May 25, 2006), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/icsidblobs/onlineawards/c4025/ds11651_en.pdf;
Nat’l Grid P.L.C. v. Arg. Republic, BIT Arb. Trib., Award, ¶¶ 92–94 (Garro, Kessler, Sureda, Arbs.
2008), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0555.pdf.; Suez v. Arg. Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 52–68 (Aug. 3, 2006),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0819.pdf; RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v. Russian
Fed’n, SCC Case No. Arb. V 079/2005, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 127–131 (Oct. 1, 2007),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0719.pdf; Quasar de Valors SICAV S.A. v.
Russian Fed’n, SCC Case No. 24/2007, Award on Preliminary Objections, ¶¶ 86–101, 119 (Mar. 20,
2009), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0714.pdf (rejecting the expansion of
MFN treatment to procedural issues on the grounds that the applicable MFN clause was expressly limited
to fair and equitable treatment while accepting, in principle, that the MFN clause applies equally to
substantive and procedural provisions); Austrian Airlines v. Slovak Republic, BIT Arb. Trib., Award, ¶¶
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adopted a textualist interpretative strategy that largely deferred to the plain
language of the most common formulation of the MFN clause.109
Particularly, since most BITs state that the MFN clause applies to “all
matters” subject to the BIT, or simply the “treatment of investors,” a literalist
reading supports the conclusion that the MFN clause applies to ISDS.110
Delimiting the scope of the MFN clause in such a comprehensive
fashion perfectly dovetails with the harmonizing theory of international
investment law. The tribunals that promoted this interpretation set the
unification of the ISDS procedures available to foreign investors under
different BITs as their end goal. For instance, the Tribunal in Maffezini
asserted that “the application of the most favored nation clause to dispute
settlement arrangements in the context of investment treaties might result in
the harmonization and enlargement of the scope of such arrangements.”111
Similarly, the Tribunal in Siemens noted that “the purpose of the MFN clause
is to eliminate the effect of specially negotiated provisions unless they have
been excepted.”112 Taken to its logical end, the expansive application of the
126–135
(Brower,
Trapl,
Arbs.
2009),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0048_0.pdf (concluding that the MFN clause does not extend to ISDS because both the
interpretation of Article 8 of the BIT and the BIT’s negotiation history clearly show that the state parties
sought to limit arbitration to the amount of compensation, but also asserting that, generally, the MFN
clause applies to both the substantive and procedural provisions of BITs); Impregilo S.p.A. v. Arg.
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award, ¶¶ 79–108 (June 21, 2011),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C109/DC2171_En.pdf; Garanti Koza
LLP v. Turkm., ICSID Case No. ARB/11/20, Decision on the Objection to Jurisdiction for Lack of
Consent,
¶¶
73–79
(July
3,
2013),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C1700/DC3632_En.pdf;
Hochtief
AG v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/31, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 59–76 (Oct. 24, 2011),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0405.pdf.
109. Maffezini, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, ¶ 60 (noting that the Argentina-Spain BIT extended the
MFN clause to “all matters subject to this Agreement”); Suez v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/17,
Decision
on
Jurisdiction,
¶
55
(May
16,
2006),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C18/DC514_En.pdf (adopting the
same textualist approach to the MFN clause of the Argentina-Spain BIT); Siemens, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/8, ¶ 106 (emphasizing that “the term ‘treatment’ is so general that the Tribunal cannot limit its
application except as specifically agreed by the parties”); Berschader v. Russ., SCC Case No. 080/2004,
Award, Separate Opinion, ¶ 23 (Apr. 21, 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0079_0.pdf (dissenting opinion justifying its conclusion by the fact that the MFN clause
was “clear and unambiguous” in not creating any exception for procedural rules).
110. Maffezini, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, ¶ 60 (noting that the Argentina-Spain BIT extended the
MFN clause to “all matters subject to this Agreement”); Suez, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, ¶ 55 (adopting
the same literalist approach to the MFN clause of the Argentina-Spain BIT); Siemens, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/8, ¶ 106 (emphasizing that “the term ‘treatment’ is so general that the Tribunal cannot limit its
application except as specifically agreed by the parties”); Berschader, SCC Case No. 080/2004, ¶ 23
(dissenting opinion justifying its conclusion by the fact that the MFN clause was “clear and unambiguous”
in not creating any exception for procedural rules).
111. Maffezini, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, ¶ 62.
112. Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, ¶ 106; see also id. ¶ 120 (concluding that “the intended
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MFN clause can be used to equalize the procedural treatment of all foreign
investors. Regardless of what the BIT between a foreign investor’s home
state and the host state may provide for, all foreign investors investing in the
same host state would have access to the same ISDS mechanisms under the
same conditions.113
Nevertheless, the harmonizing tribunals did not completely disregard
the contractual aspect of BITs. The Tribunal in Maffezini carved out an
exception for specific provisions in the basic treaty that should not be
overridden through the MFN clause.114 The Tribunal indicated that these
exceptions are crucial to avoid “treaty-shopping,” which refers to the
possibility that foreign investors may pick and choose ISDS provisions from
other BITs without considering the specificity of some of the basic treaty’s
provisions.115 In some instances, those provisions are the very reason why
two states agree to sign a BIT in the first place. The tribunals that followed
in Maffezini’s footsteps generally upheld the same exceptions as the outer
limits of the MFN-based harmonization of ISDS.116
The foregoing harmonization endeavors pressed many tribunals to react

result of the clause . . . is to harmonize benefits agreed with a party with those considered more favorable
granted to another party”); Gas Nat. SDG, S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, ¶ 49. In RosInvestCo, the
Tribunal affirmed that the establishment of jurisdiction through the MFN clauses “is a normal result of
the application of MFN clauses, the very character and intention of which is that protection not accepted
in one treaty is widened by transferring the protection accorded in another treaty.” RosInvestCo, SCC
Case No. Arb. V 079/2005, ¶ 131.
113. The Tribunal in Telefónica which, as will be shown later, pushed harmonization under the MFN
clause one step further beyond Maffezini, alluded to that goal by noting that “it appears correct to state
that ‘the basic purpose of MFN is to guarantee equality of competitive opportunities for foreign investors
in the host state.’” Telefónica, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/20, ¶ 98 (citing Jürgen Kurtz, The Delicate
Extension of Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment to Foreign Investors: Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA,
BILATERAL TREATIES, AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 523 (Todd Weiler ed. 2005)).
114. Maffezini, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, ¶ 63.
115. Id.
116. In Tecmed, the Tribunal adopted Maffezini’s distinction between “matters of procedure or
jurisdiction” and matters “that must be deemed to be specifically negotiated by the Contracting Parties.”
It concluded that the ratione temporis, i.e., the temporal scope, of the Mexico-Spain BIT belongs to the
latter rather the former. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No.
ARB
(AF)/00/2,
Award,
¶
69
(May
29,
2003),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/icsidblobs/onlineawards/C3785/DC4873_en.pdf. Accordingly, the
Tribunal rejected the foreign investor’s claim that the MFN clause of the Mexico-Spain BIT allows the
importation of a provision in the Austria-Mexico BIT that makes it possible for foreign investors to
retroactively enforce their rights. Id. Similarly, in Siemens, the Tribunal accepted Maffezini’s distinction
between matters that could be overridden under the MFN clause and those considered “essential to [the]
agreement.” Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, ¶¶ 108–110. In Telefónica, the Tribunal accepted some
limits on what could be imported into the basic treaty under the MFN clause, even though it went beyond
Maffezini by allowing the foreign investor to bypass an eighteen-month domestic litigation requirement
before resorting to arbitration. Telefónica, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/20, ¶¶ 101–108.

HAMDY FOR ADOBE (DO NOT DELETE)

316

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

12/19/2022 10:11 PM

[Vol 32:287

by limiting the MFN clause to the substantive provisions of BITs. The
tribunals in both Salini and Plama took the lead by rejecting the claimants’
argument that the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals can be expanded through
the MFN clause in the basic treaty.117 Following these two decisions, many
tribunals declined to apply the MFN clause to ISDS altogether without
express authorization in the basic treaty.118 Other tribunals split the
difference by prohibiting the importation of new ISDS mechanisms into the
basic treaty while allowing investors to claim any more favorable conditions
for having recourse to the ISDS mechanisms already established under the
basic treaty.119
Confining the MFN clause to the substantive provisions of BITs was
mainly motivated by some problematic consequences of harmonization
rather than the language of the MFN clause.120 This is because, at face value,
117. The claimant in Salini sought to import an umbrella clause into the basic treaty, the Italy-Jordan
BIT, which would have established jurisdiction for the Tribunal over not only treaty but also contractual
claims. Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision
on
Jurisdiction,
¶¶
102–119
(Nov.
29,
2004),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C218/DC635_En.pdf. The Tribunal
rejected the investor’s argument on the grounds that the MFN clause “does not apply insofar as dispute
settlement clauses are concerned.” Id. ¶ 119. In Plama, the claimant invoked the MFN clause in the basic
treaty to establish jurisdiction for an ICSID tribunal by reference to the Bulgaria-Finland BIT. The MFN
clause would have allowed the investor to avoid the basic treaty’s restriction of investors’ remedies to
UNCITRAL arbitration, and only with respect to the amount of compensation. In ruling against the
claimant, the Tribunal noted that, in principle, the MFN treatment does not extend to the ISDS provisions
of BITs absent an express agreement between the state parties. Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of
Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 183, 223 (Feb. 8, 2005),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0669.pdf.
118. In Telenor, the Tribunal held that the ISDS provision in the Hungary-Norway BIT, which was
limited to disputes about the amount of compensation, cannot be overridden by importing more expansive
ISDS provisions from other BITs signed by Hungary. The Tribunal was of the view that more favorable
treatment covers substantive rights only to the exclusion of ISDS. Telenor Mobile Commc’ns A.S. v.
Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, Award, ¶¶ 90–101 (Sept. 13, 2006),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0858.pdf; see also Wintershall AG v. Arg.
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, Award, ¶ 160–167 (Dec. 8, 2008),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0907.pdf; Shum v. Republic of Peru,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, ¶¶ 199–216 (June 19, 2009),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0880.pdf. In Daimler, the Tribunal
declined to take jurisdiction because the investor failed to submit the dispute to domestic courts for
eighteen months before initiating arbitral proceedings. The Tribunal dismissed the investor’s argument
that the eighteen-month requirement can be bypassed through the MFN clause by importing ISDS
provisions from other BITs that provide for shorter cooling-off periods or absolve foreign investors from
the requirement altogether. Daimler Fin. Servs. AG v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award,
¶¶ 188–194, 199–200 (Aug. 22, 2012), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita1082.pdf.
119. In fact, the Plama Tribunal suggested this distinction. Plama, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, ¶
209; see also Wintershall, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, ¶¶ 173–176.
120. See, e.g., Salini, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, ¶ 115; see also Impregilo S.p.A. v. Arg. Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, ¶¶ 100–108,
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the unqualified formulation of the MFN clause in most BITs does not lend
much support to any distinction between substantive and procedural
provisions.121 As a result, the proponents of excluding ISDS from the MFN
treatment resorted to teleological interpretation to justify this distinction.122
The tribunals that opposed procedural harmonization through the MFN
clause align with the pluralist theory of international investment law.
Although they based their objections on a variety of reasons, the underlying
impetus was a deep commitment to avoiding any encroachment on the
specific bargain, or contract, embodied in the applicable BIT.123 In some
cases, objections emanated from the specific language of the MFN clause.124
Tribunals emphasized the absence of all-encompassing language similar to
that of the Argentina-Spain BIT, which refers to “all matters” subject to the
BIT, and on the basis of which the Tribunal in Maffezini reached its
conclusions.125 In other cases, tribunals stressed the consensual nature of
ISDS, which requires clear and unambiguous consent to be expressed by the
state parties to a BIT in order for an arbitral tribunal to have jurisdiction.126
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0418.pdf.
121. The Tribunal in Salini, for instance, insisted on distinguishing between the substantive and
procedural provisions of the Italy-Jordan BIT for the purposes of applying the MFN clause, even though
the MFN clause was completely unqualified. Salini, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, ¶ 118. The Tribunal
reasoned that the lack of a qualification does not mean that the MFN clause applies to ISDS, unless the
MFN clause includes a statement that makes it applicable to “all rights or all matters covered by the
agreement,” or it is shown that the parties intended to expand the scope of the MFN clause to include
ISDS. Id. The Tribunal in Wintershall provided a more elaborate explanation of this distinction. See
Wintershall, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, ¶¶ 162–171, 192–193. In Berschader, the Tribunal browsed
different provisions of the basic treaty with a view to showing that some of them can never be altered by
foreign investors under the MFN clause, thereby concluding that the application of the MFN clause “to
all matters” should not include every provision in the basic treaty. Berschader v. Russ., SCC Case No.
080/2004, Award, Separate Opinion, ¶¶ 186–194. Expectedly, the aforementioned distinction is not
convincing to the tribunals that apply the MFN clause to the procedural provisions of BITs which, to
these tribunals, are “of the same protective value as any substantive protection.” RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v.
Russian Fed’n, SCC Case No. Arb. V 079/2005, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 132 (Oct. 5, 2007).
122. Interestingly, the teleological interpretation of the MFN clause was based on the very reasons
that pushed the Maffezini Tribunal to carve out exceptions to its expansive approach, primarily treaty
shopping. See, e.g., Salini, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, ¶ 115; see also Impregilo, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/17, ¶¶ 100–108.
123. Like many tribunals which espouse this view, the Tribunal in Plama concluded that the scope
of the MFN clause should be determined in light of “the presumed intent of Contracting Parties.” Plama,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, ¶ 219.
124. See Salini, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, ¶ 118; Wintershall, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, ¶¶
162, 172.
125. As we saw before, the Berschader Tribunal pushed Plama one step further by holding that even
the “all matters” formula is not sufficient to render the MFN clause applicable to dispute settlement.
Berschader, SCC Case No. 080/2004, ¶¶ 179, 181; see also Daimler, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, ¶¶ 234–
236 (Aug. 22, 2012), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1082.pdf.
126. Plama, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, ¶¶ 198–200; Wintershall, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14 ¶
167.
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To those tribunals, the referral to an ISDS provision in another BIT, even if
signed by the same state party, does not represent clear and unambiguous
consent.127
Moreover, tribunals asserted that the bargain between the state parties
regarding ISDS must be respected, no matter how idiosyncratic it might be
in comparison with other BITs.128 Therefore, foreign investors should not
use the MFN clause to disrupt the state parties’ expectations about ISDS.129
Lastly, some tribunals critiqued the harmonizing approach because it may
well allow foreign investors to benefit from the more favorable procedural
treatment in the comparator treaty without abiding by the comparator treaty’s
restrictions on the use of ISDS—a practice known as the “self-adaptation of
an MFN provision” or the “basket of treatment approach.”130
The jurisprudential divide over the scope of the MFN clause remains
unsettled to this day. The divide is best captured by the decision of the
Annulment Committee in the Impregilo S.p.A. case in which the Annulment
Committee rejected Argentina’s argument that a manifest excess of powers
can be attributed to the Tribunal under Article 52 of the ICSID
Convention.131 Argentina claimed that the Tribunal manifestly exceeded its
powers because it based its jurisdiction on the MFN clause that was used by
the claimant to import the ISDS provisions of the U.S.-Argentina BIT into
the Argentina-Italy BIT (the basic treaty).132 The Annulment Committee
took note of the cleavage in the case law that leaves the scope of the MFN
clause an open-ended question.133 It rightly opined that “neither applying an
127. Notably, some of the tribunals that equally apply the MFN clause to substantive and procedural
BIT provisions consider the consent to ICSID arbitration made by the host state in other BITs sufficient.
See, e.g., Garanti Koza, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/20, Decision on the Objection to Jurisdiction for Lack
of
Consent,
¶
73,
(July
3,
2013),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C1700/DC3632_En.pdf.
128. Plama, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, ¶ 107; Wintershall, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, ¶¶ 179,
190; Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v. Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, Award, ¶ 95 (Sept.
13, 2006), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C240/DC652_En.pdf.
129. Id.
130. Plama, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, ¶ 219; Telenor, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, ¶ 93. On the
opposite view, see Siemens AG v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction,
¶¶
108–110,
120–21
(Aug.
3,
2004),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0788.pdf. The Siemens Tribunal noted that there might be some merit to the proposition
that, as long as the comparator treaty has been negotiated as a package, third party investors should be
subject to that treaty’s restrictions because such restrictions might have been a quid pro quo for the more
favorable treatment. Id. The Tribunal disagreed with that view, however, maintaining that the MFN clause
should be used to import more advantageous treatment only and that foreign investors should be allowed
to pick and choose what they deem more favorable. Id.
131. Impregilo S.p.A. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Decision on the Application
for Annulment, ¶¶ 131–132, https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3044.pdf .
132. Id. ¶ 134.
133. Id. ¶ 147. The Annulment Committee added that “the interpretation made by an Arbitration
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MFN clause to jurisdictional issues nor refusing to apply it to assume
jurisdiction may be considered, per se, as a manifest excess of powers.”134
D. Fair and Equitable Treatment
The FET standard has grown from a “vacant expression” into the most
penetrating obligation host states owe to foreign investors under
international investment law.135 Originally, it was intended to shield foreign
investors from infringements that do not rise to the level of expropriation.136
In that sense, it was thought of as providing ancillary legal protection that
merely complements the protection other BIT standards afford to foreign
investors.137
Over the past two decades, however, the independence of FET was
reinforced as a standard that could be breached, even if host states do not
violate any other BIT provision.138 Litigators deployed the standard, with
tribunals’ endorsement, in an innovative way that probably was never
envisioned by the standard’s designers to discipline a wide range of host
states’ measures. Very quickly, the FET standard has become the most
frequently invoked standard in ISDS and the primary ground for foreign
investors’ victories in investment claims.139 In other words, it has become
the single most important provision in BITs.
While the vast majority of BITs include an FET standard, a great
variation in its formulation can be delineated. Most BITs simply state that
host states should accord foreign investors “fair and equitable treatment,”
Tribunal in one way or another on the possible extension of the MFN clause to jurisdictional issues can
never by itself constitute a clear, obvious, and self-evident excess of powers.” Id. ¶ 141.
134. Id. ¶ 140.
135. Roland Klager, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Look at the Theoretical Underpinnings of
Legitimacy and Fairness, 11 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 435, 443 (2010).
136. PSEG Glob. Inc. v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, ¶ 238 (Jan. 19, 2007),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0695.pdf; Cont’l Casualty Co. v. Arg.
Republic,
ICSID
Case
No.
ARB/03/9,
Award,
¶
254
(Sept.
5,
2008),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0228.pdf.
137. Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶¶ 271–278 (Sept.
28, 2007), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C8/DC694_En.pdf.
138. For instance, the FET standard could be breached even if host states treat foreign investors the
same way they treat their own national investors and, hence, do not violate the NT standard. See, e.g.,
Genin v. Republic of Est., ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award, ¶ 367 (June 25, 2001),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C178/DC592_En.pdf; S.D. Myers,
Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA Arb. Trib., Partial Award, ¶ 259 (Schwartz, Chiasson, Arbs. 2000),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0747.pdf. Similarly, host states may still
violate the FET standard even if they do not discriminate among different foreign investors, meaning that
there is no violation of the MFN clause. See, e.g., Flemingo Duty Free Shop Pri. Ltd. v. Republic of Pol.,
Award, ¶ 531 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw7709_3.pdf.
139. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 60, at 130.

HAMDY FOR ADOBE (DO NOT DELETE)

320

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

12/19/2022 10:11 PM

[Vol 32:287

without any limitation or qualification.140 Other BITs qualify this treatment
in one of two ways.141 Some BITs stipulate that providing FET to foreign
investors should be done “in accordance with the principles of international
law” or “in accordance with international law.”142 Other BITs limit FET to
the treatment required under customary international law (CIL).143

140. See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Albania for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Alb.-U.K., art. 2-2, Mar. 30, 1994, GR. BRIT. T.S. No. 17 (1996) (Cm. 3702); Treaty between
the Federal Republic of Germany and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan concerning the Encouragement
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Afg.-Ger., art. 2-2, Feb. 2, 2005, BGBl II 101 (Ger.); Accordo
del 3 giugno 2014 tra la Confederazione Svizzera e la Georgia concernente la promozione e la protezione
reciproca degli investimenti (con Prot.) [Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and Georgia on the
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments], Geor.-Switz., art. 4-1, June 3, 2014, RS
0.975.236.0 (Switz.); Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Iraq for the Promotion and
Protection of Investment, Iraq-Japan, art. 5-1, June 17, 2012, 2012 Jōyaku web,
https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/treaty/submit/session183/pdfs/agree-17_01.pdf.
141. French BITs use the qualifier “in accordance with the principles of International Law.” See, e.g.,
Accord entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la République
Argentine sur l’encouragement et la protection réciproques des investissements [Agreement between the
Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Argentine Republic on the Reciprocal
Promotion and Protection of Investments], Arg.-Fr., art. 3, July 3, 1991, 1993 Journal Officiel de la
République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France] 8164 [hereinafter BIT, Arg.-Fr.]; Accord entre
le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la République de Moldavie sur
l’encouragement et la protection réciproques des investissements [Agreement between the Government
of the French Republic and the Government of the Republic of Moldova on the Reciprocal Promotion
and Protection of Investments], Fr.-Mold., art. 3, Sept. 8, 1997, 1999 J.O. 6781 [hereinafter BIT, Fr.Mold.]; Accord entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement des États-Unis du
Mexique sur l’encouragement et la protection réciproques des investissements [Agreement between the
Government of the French Republic and the Government of the United Mexican States on the Reciprocal
Promotion and Protection of Investments], Fr.-Mex., art. 4, Nov. 12, 1998, 2000 J.O. 17062 [hereinafter
BTI, Fr.-Mex.]; see also Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
Republic of Venezuela for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Venez., art. 2-2, July 1,
1996, 1998 Can. T.S. No. 20 (using the same qualification) [hereinafter BIT, Can.-Venez.]; Agreement
between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Government of the Republic of Venezuela for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-Venez.,
art. 2-2, Mar. 15, 1995, GR. BRIT. T.S. No. 83 (1996) (Cm. 3423) [hereinafter BIT, U.K.-Venez.]
(qualifying the FET standard by a reference to “international law”). For instance, the U.S.-Chile FTA
qualifies FET by an explicit reference to “customary international law.” See U.S.–Chile Free Trade
Agreement, Chile-U.S., art. 10.4(2), June 6, 2003, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/chile-fta/final-text [hereinafter FTA, Chile-U.S.]. This qualification has become the standard
in U.S. Model BITs since 2004. See 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 5-2, 2004,
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf. Likewise, more recent Spanish BITs use an
identical qualifier. See, e.g., Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments
Between the United Mexican States and the Kingdom of Spain, Mex.-Spain, art. 4(1), Oct. 10, 2006, 2553
U.N.T.S. 45554 [hereinafter BIT, Mex.-Spain].
142. See, e.g., BIT, Arg.-Fr., supra note 141, art. 3; BIT, Fr.-Mold., supra note 141, art. 3; BIT, Fr.Mex., supra note 141, art. 4; see also BIT, Can.-Venez., supra note 141, art. 2-2; BIT, U.K.-Venez., supra
note 141, art. 2-2.
143. See FTA, Chile-U.S., supra note 141, art. 10.4 (2); 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty, supra note 141, art. 5-2, 2004; BIT, Mex.-Spain, supra note 141, art. 4(1).
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The genealogy of FET goes back to the minimum standard of treatment
(MST) of foreigners under CIL. Two variants of the MST are widely cited.
The first is known as the Neer standard. It was developed by the U.S.-Mexico
General Claims Commission in 1927 in a case arising out of the murder of a
U.S. citizen in Mexico.144 The Commission set a very high threshold for
holding a state internationally liable for the denial of justice under
international law.145 Since then, the Neer standard has been viewed as
defining the MST host states owe to foreigners under CIL.
In a 1989 case between the U.S. and Italy, a Chamber of the
International Court of Justice formulated a similar standard for the definition
of “arbitrariness” prohibited under CIL. The new standard came to be known
as the ELSI standard.146 The U.S. claimed that the Mayor of Palermo’s
temporary requisitioning of a plant owned by an Italian company that was
partly owned by American shareholders was an “arbitrary action.”147 The
Chamber of the Court decided the case by formulating a new standard that
was slightly different from the Neer standard but still employed a similarly
high threshold for holding a state liable for the mistreatment of foreigners
under CIL.148
In investment arbitration, the most challenging and divisive question
arbitral tribunals encountered regarding the FET standard was the
determination of the standard’s content. The FET standard is not defined in
BITs.149 It is also too brief and relatively vague; therefore, its content can
hardly be determined through the ordinary meaning of what is “fair” or
“equitable.”150 Expectedly, tribunals split as to what legal obligations the
FET standard lays upon host states.
Based on a counter-intuitive reading of the FET standard’s language,
144. Neer v. United Mexican States, Decision of the U.S.-Mex. Claims Commission (Oct. 15, 1926),
21 A.J.I.L. 555.
145. The Commission stated: “[T]he propriety of governmental acts should be put to the test of
international standards, and . . . the treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international
delinquency, should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to willful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency
of governmental action so far short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man
would readily recognize its insufficiency.” Id. at 556.
146. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. It.), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. Rep. 15, ¶ 128 (July 20).
147. Id. ¶ 123.
148. The ICJ held that: “Arbitrariness is not so much something opposed to a rule of law, as
something opposed to the rule of law . . . [i]t is a wilful disregard of due process of law, an act which
shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of juridical propriety.” Id. ¶ 128.
149. El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, ¶ 335 (Oct. 31,
2011), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0270.pdf.
150. Lemire v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 258 (Jan.
14, 2010), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0453.pdf; Enron Creditors
Recovery Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶ 256 (May 22, 2007),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0293.pdf.
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some tribunals confined its content to the MST under CIL.151 Their views
resonated with Judge Higgins’ statement in her separate opinion in the Oil
Platforms case in which she noted that it is widely accepted in international
law that “the key terms ‘fair and equitable treatment to nationals and
companies’ . . . are legal terms of art well known in the field of overseas
investment protection,” and that these terms have a “well-known
meaning.”152 The well-known meaning Judge Higgins referred to was
nothing but the MST under CIL.
In marked contrast to that conclusion, many scholars and arbitral
tribunals were of the view that the FET standard should be deemed an
autonomous treaty-based standard that is distinct from the MST under
CIL.153 They argued that, textually, it does not make much sense that BITs
would refer to the MST using the language of “fair” and “equitable”
treatment.154 They also suggested that FET is rather a novel standard that
should be fleshed out through investment arbitration.155
Determining the content of the FET standard was not divisive only
among arbitral tribunals. The case law shows that the independence of the
FET standard is vehemently propagated by claimants, while respondents
take the opposite stance.156 Several international organizations, such as the
OECD and the European Parliament, tried to settle the debate by expressing
unequivocal support for interpreting the standard by reference to the MST
under CIL.157 In the NAFTA context, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission
(FTC)—a body that had the power to issue binding interpretations—
officially stated that Article 1105, the FET standard under NAFTA,
“prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment”
151. See, e.g., Genin v. Republic of Est., ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award, ¶ 367 (June 25, 2001),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0359.pdf; MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v.
Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, ¶¶ 107–115 (May 25, 2004),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0544.pdf; Lemire, ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/18, ¶¶ 234–273.
152. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 90, ¶ 39 (Dec. 12) (separate opinion by
Higgins, J.).
153. See, e.g., DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 60, at 134; Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United
Republic of Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, ¶ 591 (July 24, 2008),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0095.pdf.
154. See, e.g., DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 60, at 134; Biwater, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, ¶
591.
155. PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 625 (1995).
156. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA Arb. Trib., Award in Respect of
Damages,
¶¶
55–58
(Dervaird,
Greenberg,
Belman,
Arbs.
2002),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0686.pdf.
157. OECD, Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property art.1 cmt. 4, Oct. 12, 1967, 7
I.L.M. 120. See also Resolution of April, 6 2011 on the Future European International Investment Policy,
¶ 19, EUR. PARL. DOC. PVII 296(V) (2011).
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and does not require “treatment in addition to or beyond that.”158
The opposition between the pluralist and harmonizing theories of
international investment law captures an aspect of this jurisprudential divide
that is largely overlooked in the literature.159 Rather than simply focusing on
whether tribunals considered the FET standard equivalent to or distinct from
the MST under CIL, the pluralism-harmonization framework pays attention
to how tribunals reached their conclusions. Specifically, it takes into account
whether tribunals limited their consideration to the text of the applicable BIT
or looked beyond it. The how question is important because it reveals some
motivations for tribunals’ decisions that are quite distinct from the classical
pro-investor and pro-state “biases.”
The pluralist and harmonizing sensibilities of tribunals figured in their
operationalization of both the qualified and unqualified versions of the FET
standard. Regardless of the existence or absence of a qualifier, pluralist
tribunals were more willing to condone the doctrinal variation of the standard
in different BITs, irrespective of how idiosyncratic the standard’s
formulation might be in any single BIT. Some pluralist tribunals concluded
that the FET standard corresponds to the MST under CIL, while others
asserted that it accords foreign investors further legal protection. On the
contrary, harmonizing tribunals were all in favor of unifying the legal
protection accorded to foreign investors under the FET standard, which
raised a question about the substance of this universal FET standard. As the
following discussion will show, the harmonizing approach was especially
significant in disputes where the FET standard was qualified.
1. Unqualified fair and equitable treatment
The lack of a qualification in the FET standard means that arbitral
tribunals enjoy almost unfettered power to determine the content of FET.
From the perspective of the pluralism-harmonization framework, such a
determination can be premised on a view of the FET standard as either a
provision in a bargain or contract between two sovereigns or, conversely, a
legal principle that is part of the investment regime. The first premise is
evidently pluralist, while the second is more regime-oriented and aligns with
the harmonizing theory of international investment law.
Only a small minority of tribunals were pluralist while enforcing

158. NAFTA Free Trade Comm’n, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, §B,
ORG.
AM.
STATES
(July
31,
2001),
http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/commission/ch11understanding_e.asp.
159. For a concise summary of this divide in the case law, see El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Arg.
Republic,
ICSID
Case
No.
ARB/03/15,
Award,
¶
335
(Oct.
31,
2011),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0270.pdf.
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unqualified FET standards. They based their conclusions on the specific
formulation of the applicable FET standard without considering whether
FET has become a universal legal principle.160 Within this small minority,
tribunals widely varied in their views about the content of FET. Genin stands
out as potentially the only example where a pluralist tribunal sided with the
view that an unqualified FET standard refers to the MST under CIL.161 Other
tribunals held that foreign investors are entitled to better treatment than the
MST, with some justifying their findings by the ordinary meaning of the
terms “fair” and “equitable.”162 Other tribunals reached the same conclusion
by resorting to a “literal reading” of the FET standard.163 Remarkably, the
aforementioned tribunals adopted a more or less deferential interpretative
approach: They were very keen on sticking as closely as possible to the
language of the applicable FET standard on the grounds that it embodies the
will of the parties.
By contrast, the majority of arbitral tribunals not only saw in the
absence of a qualifier of FET a reason to interpret FET as an autonomous
standard vis-à-vis the MST under CIL. They also maintained that host states’
FET obligations represent a new rule on the treatment of foreign investors
under CIL.164 Under this new customary rule, host states should provide
160. Genin v. Republic of Est., ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award, ¶ 367 (June 25, 2001),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0359.pdf; MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v.
Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, ¶¶ 107–115 (May 25, 2004),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0544.pdf; Lemire v. Ukr., ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶¶ 234–273 (Jan. 14, 2010),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0453.pdf.
161. Genin, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, ¶ 367. The Tribunal equated the unqualified FET standard
in the U.S.-Estonia BIT with the MST under CIL. Without considering FET in any other BIT, it
established a high threshold for liability and, as a result, rejected the foreign investor’s claim.
162. In MTD, the Tribunal emphasized that “there is no reference to customary international law in
the BIT in relation to fair and equitable treatment” and that its mission is limited to the enforcement of
the Chile-Malaysia BIT. In the Tribunal’s view, the FET standard meant according foreign investors
treatment better than what is required under the MST because the ordinary meaning of “fair” and
“equitable” treatment is treatment that is “just,” “even-handed,” “unbiased,” or “legitimate.” MTD, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/7, ¶¶ 110–115.
163. In Lemire, the Tribunal took notice of the linguistic similarity between the FET standard in the
1996 U.S.-Ukraine BIT and the 2004 U.S. Model BIT which equates FET to the MST. Lemire, ICSID
Case No. ARB/06/18, ¶¶ 251–260. The Tribunal asserted, however, that U.S.-Ukraine BIT sets FET and
the MST as separate standards, with the latter being a floor rather than a ceiling. Id. Having reasoned that
FET is an autonomous standard, the Tribunal stated that a “literal reading” of the standard shows that it
could be violated by either arbitrary or discriminatory measures. Id.
164. See, e.g., CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶
276
(May 12,
2005),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0184.pdf
(proclaiming that “in addition to the specific terms of the Treaty, the significant number of treaties, both
bilateral and multilateral, that have dealt with this standard also unequivocally shows that fair and
equitable treatment is inseparable from stability and predictability”). In Azurix, the Tribunal pointed out
the unqualified formulation of the FET standard in the U.S.-Argentina BIT. Yet it did not consider that
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foreign investors with legal protection that goes far beyond what is required
under the Neer and ELSI standards. Besides the heightened protection, the
main implication of this interpretation is that the formulation of the
applicable FET standard no longer matters, which in effect means a complete
harmonization of all FET standards.
As instructed by Article 31 of the VCLT, tribunals in this group took
the language of the FET standard, as well as the object and purpose of BITs,
as the point of departure for their analysis.165 Their decisions typically began
by noting the absence of a qualifier of FET.166 They also sought to establish
a connection between the object and purpose of BITs and the duties imposed
on host states under the FET standard.167 In this vein, they predominantly
defined the object and purpose of BITs as the creation of a stable legal and
economic environment for investment.168 Yet tribunals did not stop at this
point. Their harmonizing orientation pushed their reasoning one step further,
formulation “of material significance for its application of the standard … to the facts of the case” because
“the minimum requirement to satisfy this standard has evolved and the Tribunal considers that its content
is substantially similar whether the terms are interpreted in their ordinary meaning, as required by the
Vienna Convention, or in accordance with customary international law.” Azurix Corp. v. Arg. Republic,
ICSID
Case
No.
ARB/01/12,
Award,
¶
361
(July
14,
2006),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0061.pdf; see also LG&E Energy Corp. v.
Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 125 (Oct. 3, 2006),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C208/DC627_En.pdf (insisting that
“tribunals have repeatedly concluded … that the stability of the legal and business framework in the State
party is an essential element in the standard of what is fair and equitable treatment” and that this
understanding embodies “an emerging standard of fair and equitable treatment in international law”);
Siemens AG v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶¶ 291, 300 (Feb. 6, 2007),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/icsidblobs/OnlineAwards/C3004/CLA-050_Eng.pdf (holding that
the interpretation of the FET standard should be done in accordance with international law even if no
reference is made in the BIT to CIL and, as a result, advancing the view that the applicable standard is
the MST under CIL, not in the Neer or ELSI sense but as it has evolved at the time of the conclusion of
the BIT). In Sempra, the Tribunal highlighted the doctrinal variation of BITs with regard to the FET
standard as well as the fragmentary evolution of its interpretation. Sempra Energy Int’l. v. Arg. Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶¶ 296–299, 301–302 (Sept. 28, 2007),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0770.pdf. The Tribunal concluded,
however, that the “the principle of good faith is . . . relied on as the common guiding beacon that will
orient the understanding and interpretation of obligations, just as happens under civil codes.” Id. ¶ 297.
The Tribunal added that “the circumstances of individual cases are almost invariably different.” Id. ¶ 299.
Nonetheless, “there remains . . . a requirement of good faith that permeates the whole approach to the
protection granted under treaties and contracts.” Id.
165. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 22, art. 31.
166. Azurix, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, ¶ 361 (noting that the unqualified language of Article
II.2(a) of the U.S.-Argentina BIT makes the MST a floor rather than a ceiling of the treatment required
under the FET standard); Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, ¶¶ 291–292.
167. LG&E, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, ¶ 125; Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, ¶ 290; Enron
Corp. Ponderosa Assets, L.P v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶ 259 (May 22, 2007),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0293.pdf; Sempra, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/16, ¶ 300.
168. Id.
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as they affirmed that their interpretation of the FET standard is not unique to
the case at hand and is also corroborated by other tribunals’
interpretations.169 On that basis, they made the assertion that a customary
FET standard was on the rise.170
Harmonizing tribunals enforced unqualified FET standards by devising
a new subrule that took the limited sovereignty of host states as a baseline.
In contradistinction to the restrictive MST, which largely relies on subjective
categories such as bad faith, the new subrule is objective in the sense that it
can be breached even without any bad faith on the part of host states. It
renders host states liable, unless otherwise proven, whenever they violate the
legitimate expectations of foreign investors at the time of establishment.171
The new subrule thus places the burden of proving the legitimacy of the
disputed measures on host states as long as foreign investors establish a
violation of their legitimate expectations. It also limits tribunals’ use of
discretion due to its objective nature, thereby increasing legal certainty and
making it easier for foreign investors to predict the legal protection they
would receive ex-ante.
Although the early decisions embodying the preceding view were all
related to the Argentine crisis and, therefore, involved only the FET standard
in Argentine BITs, identical reasoning was adopted in subsequent cases
enforcing other BITs.172 Tribunals in all these cases did not pay much
169. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 276 (May
12, 2005), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0187.pdf (substantiating its
decision by the fact that “many arbitral decisions and scholarly writings point in the same direction”);
Azurix, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, ¶¶ 366–373; Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, ¶¶ 294–298.
170. Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶ 260 (citing prior decisions that viewed the FET standard
as an “emerging standard of FET in international law” that could be breached without bad faith on the
part of host states); Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶¶ 297–299.
171. CMS, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, ¶ 280; Siemens, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, ¶ 299
(emphasizing that bad faith is no longer required to establish violations of FET under international law,
and that the FET standard requires host states to respect foreign investors’ legitimate expectations);
Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶ 262–263 (holding that, pursuant to Article 31 of the VCLT, the FET
standard in the U.S.-Argentina BIT mandates that the host state create a “stable framework for
investment” and respect foreign investors’ expectations); Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶¶ 297–
299.
172. See, e.g., Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22,
Award,
¶¶
586–603
(July
24,
2008),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C67/DC1589_En.pdf. The Biwater
Tribunal was unwilling to make any generalizations about the content of FET given its varying
formulation in different BITs. Id. Nevertheless, having found no significant qualification of the FET
standard under Article 2(2) of the U.K.-Tanzania BIT, the Tribunal determined the standard’s content in
light of the “specific components . . . which have been elaborated and developed in previous arbitrations.”
Id. ¶ 602; See also El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, ¶¶
336–337,
355,
373
(Oct.
31,
2011)
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0270.pdf. The El Paso Tribunal concluded that the FET standard must be defined by
reference to the MST under CIL because of the identical functions of both standards. Id. ¶ 336. After
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deference to the language of the FET standard. They went beyond what many
would consider necessary gap-filling to promote a universal customary FET
standard. The essence of that standard is an objective obligation not to defeat
the legitimate expectations of foreign investors at the time of establishment.
2. Qualified fair and equitable treatment
The operationalization of qualified FET standards makes the opposition
between the pluralist and harmonizing commitments of tribunals even more
apparent and clearly shows the practical implications of subscribing to either
view. Qualified FET standards leave tribunals with little room for
interpretative maneuvers; hence, tribunals have to square their chosen
interpretation with the qualifier used in the applicable standard. As
previously noted, NAFTA was one of the most prominent examples of
international agreements that qualify the FET standard by an explicit
reference to the MST under CIL.173 As a result, most of the decisions
concerning the operationalization of qualified FET standards are related to
NAFTA, although a number of important decisions pertain to other BITs.
Similar to what we saw with respect to unqualified FET standards, only
a minority of tribunals espoused pluralism while enforcing qualified FET
standards.174 In few cases, all of which were decided under NAFTA, pluralist
browsing prior arbitral decisions, the Tribunal sided with the definition that makes foreign investors’
expectations central to FET. Id. ¶ 355. It added that these expectations are not entirely subjective, and
that the FET standard entails reasonableness and proportionality. Id. ¶ 373. In Belokon, the applicable
BIT had no qualifying language that limits FET to the MST under CIL. The Tribunal opined that “it is
right to bear in mind that the words appear in a type of treaty which became commonplace in the second
half of the 20th Century, and due consideration should be given to construing them in a way that is
consonant with those treaties in general and thus to give effect to legitimate expectations.” Belokon v.
Kyrgyz Republic, PCA Case No. AA518, Award, ¶ 224 (Oct. 24, 2014),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ITA%20LAW%207008_0.pdf. Similarly, in
Murphy Exploration, the Tribunal did not find it necessary to decide whether FET under the U.S.-Ecuador
BIT represents a more protective standard than the MST under CIL absent a qualification of the FET
standard. Murphy Expl., and Prod., Co. Int’l v. Republic of Ecuador [II], PCA Case No. 2012-16
(formerly
AA
434),
Partial
Final
Award,
¶¶
205–208
(May
6,
2016),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7489_0.pdf. However, the Tribunal
held that “[i]t is clear from the repeated reference to ‘fair and equitable’ treatment in investment treaties
and arbitral awards that the FET treaty standard is now generally accepted as reflecting recognisable
components, such as: transparency, consistency, stability, predictability, conduct in good faith and the
fulfilment of an investor’s legitimate expectations. The precise application of these components, and the
stringency of the standard applicable, may vary from case to case depending on the terms of the clause
and the specific circumstances of the case. Notwithstanding, the function of the FET clause in investment
treaties is broadly the same: it ensures the stability and predictability of the legal and business framework
in the State party subject to any qualifications otherwise established by the treaty and under international
law.” Id. ¶ 206.
173. NAFTA, supra note 80, art. 1105. Art. 1105 of NAFTA was titled “Minimum Standard of
Treatment.” Id.
174. See supra notes 160–163 and accompanying text.
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tribunals considered FET a treaty-based obligation rather than an emerging
customary standard and adopted a deferential approach that gave full effect
to the qualifying language of FET. Specifically, tribunals equated the content
of FET under NAFTA with the MST under CIL and justified this conclusion
by both the language of Article 1105 and the FTC interpretative note.175 The
only exception was the decision in S.D. Myers, which was rendered prior to
the FTC note. The S.D. Myers Tribunal reached the same conclusion solely
on the basis of the language of Article 1105.176
Apart from these sparse decisions, the vast majority of tribunals that
enforced qualified FET standards adhered steadfastly to the harmonizing
theory. Their analysis was not confined to the language of the applicable FET
standard, but also took into account the treaty practice of other countries.177
This line of cases began with some prominent decisions under NAFTA that
came out right after the FTC issued its interpretative note, except for the
Pope & Talbot decision, which was contemporaneous to the note.178

175. See, e.g., Loewen Grp., Inc. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Final Award, ¶¶ 124–137
(June 26, 2003), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0470.pdf. The Loewen
Tribunal underscored its disagreement with prior decisions that maintained that the FET standard in BITs
has given rise to a new universal FET standard. Id. It opined that, in light of the language of Article 1105
and pursuant to the FTC interpretative note, the content of the FET standard should be determined by
reference to the MST under CIL. Id. Consequently, the Tribunal applied the restrictive ELSI standard and
found no violation of Article 1105 of NAFTA. Id. In United Parcel, the Tribunal rejected the foreign
investor’s argument that an obligation to limit anticompetitive practices has become part of FET and
reaffirmed that FET under NAFTA is limited to the MST. United Parcel Serv. of Am. Inc. v. Gov’t of
Can., NAFTA Arb. Trib., Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 97 (Cass, Fortier, Keith, Arbs. 2002),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0884.pdf. In addition to citing the language
of Article 1105 and the FTC note, the Tribunal clarified that “the many bilateral treaties for the protection
of investments on which the argument depends vary in their substantive obligations; while they are large
in number their coverage is limited; and…in terms of opinio juris there is no indication that they reflect
a general sense of obligation.” Id.; see also Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States,
NAFTA Arb. Trib., Arbitral Award, ¶¶ 192–194 (Ariosa, W. . .lde, Berg, Arbs. 2006),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0431.pdf. The Thunderbird Tribunal,
taking heed of the FTC note, regarded the MST as the standard applicable under FET. Id. Despite
acknowledging that the MST has evolved since Neer, the Tribunal did not develop any new standards
and merely applied a restrictive test similar to Neer. Id.
176. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA Arb. Trib., Partial Award, ¶¶ 262–264 (Schwartz,
Chiasson, Hunter, Arbs. 2000), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0747.pdf.
The Tribunal held that requiring FET to be “in accordance with international law” means that the host
state is liable only when it treats foreign investors unfairly or unjustly in a way that is not acceptable from
an international perspective. Id. ¶ 263. The Tribunal did not argue though that a universal FET standard
is on the rise. Id. It affirmed that any determination in this regard “must be made in the light of the high
measure of deference that international law generally extends to the right of domestic authorities to
regulate matters within their own borders.” Id.
177. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA Arb. Trib., Award in Respect of
Damages,
¶¶
58–66
(Dervaird,
Greenberg,
Belman,
Arbs.
2002),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0686.pdf.
178. Pope & Talbot, NAFTA Arb. Trib., ¶¶ 58–66 (rejecting Canada’s view that Article 1105 should
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In these decisions, tribunals conceded that the qualifying language of
the FET standard limits its content to the MST under CIL. Yet this did not
simply amount to an endorsement of the Neer or ELSI standard. Instead,
tribunals asserted that the MST itself had evolved in light of the massive
number of BITs that typically include an FET standard.179 Thanks to such a
consistent treaty practice, they maintained, the MST under CIL and the FET
be limited to Neer and adding that, even if the MST under CIL is to be the standard, the inclusion of FET
in more than 1800 BITs ushers a shift in the content of MST that renders the MST more protective of
foreign investors). See Mondev Int’l. Ltd., v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶¶ 116, 118–
127 (Oct. 11, 2002), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1076.pdf. The
Mondev Tribunal held that “Article 1105(1) did not give a NAFTA tribunal an unfettered discretion to
decide for itself, on a subjective basis, what was ‘fair’ or ‘equitable’ in the circumstances of each
particular case.” Id. ¶ 119. As per the FTC note, the Tribunal equated FET under NAFTA to the MST
under CIL. This did not inhibit the Tribunal, however, from promoting a harmonizing view of FET as it
noted that “the FTC interpretations incorporate current international law, whose content is shaped by the
conclusion of more than two thousand bilateral investment treaties and many treaties of friendship and
commerce” which “largely and concordantly provide for “fair and equitable” treatment.” Id. ¶ 125. The
Tribunal also introduced the objective approach to the definition of FET when it held that the applicable
standard is not Neer but the MST as it has evolved at the time of NAFTA’s entry into force. Id. Under
the new standard, violations of FET could occur even if host states do not willfully neglect their duties or
disregard due process. In ADF Group, the Tribunal adopted a standard based on the MST as it has evolved
at the time of NAFTA’s entry into force, which was no different from Mondev’s formulation of the FET
standard. Id. ¶ 127. See also ADF Grp., Inc. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB/00/1, Award, ¶¶ 182–186
(Jan. 9, 2003), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0009.pdf (adopting the
Mondev approach). In Waste Management, the Tribunal observed that “despite certain differences of
emphasis a general standard for Article 1105 is emerging” to which the legitimate expectations of foreign
investors are relevant. Waste Mgmt. Inc. v. Mex. [II], ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, ¶ 98 (Apr.
30, 2004), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0900.pdf. In Glamis, the
Tribunal was partly sympathetic toward pluralism as it dismissed any claimed convergence between FET
and the MST under CIL and emphasized the varying formulation of FET in different BITs. Nevertheless,
the Tribunal sided with harmonizing tribunals by asserting that the MST itself has evolved into an
emerging universal rule under which bad faith on the part of host state is no longer required for violations
of FET. Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. U.S., NAFTA Arb., Award, ¶¶ 609–616 (June 8, 2009),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0378.pdf. In Merrill, the Tribunal
conceded that the FTC note refers to the MST under CIL, although not in the sense of Neer but as it has
evolved since then. More importantly, it emphasized the importance of global consistency with respect
to FET by noting that: “if the FTC Interpretation was construed so as to narrow the protection against
unfair and inequitable treatment to an international minimum standard requiring outrageous conduct of
some kind, then consistency would demand that the same standard be followed in respect of such claims
made by the NAFTA States in respect of the conduct of other countries affecting business, trade or
investments interests of their citizens abroad. Yet, this is not the case under current international practice.
Customary international law cannot be tailor made to fit different claimants in different ways. To do so
would be to countenance an unacceptable double standard.” Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v. Gov’t of
Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/07/01, Award, ¶¶ 189–213 (Mar. 31, 2010),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0504.pdf. Outside of NAFTA, the Tribunal
in Rusoro Mining agreed with the respondent that the FET standard’s reference to the principles of
international law limits FET to the MST under CIL. Nonetheless, it opined that this qualification has no
practical effect due to the convergence between FET and the MST. Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. Venez, ICSID
Case
No.
ARB(AF)/12/5,
Award,
¶¶
514–521
(Aug.
22,
2016),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7507.pdf.
179. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot, NAFTA Arb. Trib., ¶¶ 58–66.
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standard had converged into a new rule that provides foreign investors
objective legal protection delimited by their legitimate expectations at the
time of establishment.180
Outside of NAFTA, the Tribunal in Tecmed provided the clearest and
most cited analysis in this respect. The Tecmed Tribunal pioneered a slightly
different approach under which the reference to international law in FET was
taken to mean not the MST under CIL, but a stricter universal obligation to
respect foreign investors’ legitimate expectations.181 Many subsequent
tribunals adopted Tecmed, even though they disagreed over what the
reference to international law specifically means.182 But beyond that
difference, they all agreed that, under the FET standard, host states bear a
universal, objective obligation to respect investors’ legitimate
expectations.183
180. Id.
181. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/2,
Award,
¶¶
152–156
(May
29,
2003),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/icsidblobs/onlineawards/C3785/DC4873_en.pdf. The Tribunal
opposed the view that the requirement to grant FET “according to International Law” limits FET to the
MST under CIL. Id. Such a requirement, the Tribunal argued, refers to the obligation of good faith under
international law, which, according to the Tribunal, prescribes the respect of foreign investors’ legitimate
expectations that existed at the time of establishment. Id. The Tribunal called its interpretation the
“autonomous approach” because it considers FET an autonomous standard that is stricter than the MST
and could be breached even if the host state is not acting in bad faith. Id.
182. See Siemens AG v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶
108–110
(Aug.
3,
2004),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C7/DC508_En.pdf; Telefónica S.A v.
Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/20, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶
101–108
(May
25,
2006),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/icsidblobs/onlineawards/c4025/ds11651_en.pdf.
183. In Compañía de Aguas, the Tribunal read the qualification “in accordance with the principles of
international law” as a reference not to the MST under CIL but to “a wider range of international law
principles than the minimum standard alone.” Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Arg. Republic,
ICSID
Case
No.
ARB/97/3,
Award,
¶¶
7.4.1–12
(Aug.
20,
2007),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0215.pdf. The Tribunal added that the
content of FET should be determined by “contemporary principles of international law, not only . . .
principles from almost a century ago.” Id. As a result, it was of the view that the FET standard lays an
objective obligation on host states that could be breached without bad faith. Id. In Suez, the Tribunal had
to enforce the FET standards in the France-Argentina, Spain-Argentina, and the U.K.-Argentina BITs.
Suez v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 183–189 (July 30, 2010),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C18/DC514_En.pdf. Only in the first
BIT was FET qualified by a reference to “the principles of international law.” Id. Although the Tribunal
made clear that it is bound by the “specific language of each of the applicable treaties,” it completely
neutralized the reference to international law under the France-Argentina BIT by interpreting it as
referring to “the legal principles derived from all sources of international law,” thereby equating most
qualified and unqualified formulations of the FET standard. Id. ¶¶ 177–178. It further opined that “the
term ‘fair and equitable treatment’ has certain characteristics that must be recognized in applying it in
these cases.” Id. ¶ 180. The Tribunal defined those characteristics by citing previous decisions that
adopted an autonomous interpretation of FET, justifying its approach by the fact that the FET standard
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Despite being central to their conclusion, tribunals in this group,
especially under NAFTA, rarely expounded how the MST under CIL had
evolved since Neer as a result of modern BITs.184 The arguments of
respondents, i.e., host states, in those cases were no less ambiguous. In
principle, respondents concurred that the MST has evolved, but they insisted
that the threshold for violating the FET standard remains high, especially in
the context of NAFTA.185
Regardless, the convergence thesis (between the MST and the FET
standard) allowed tribunals to curtail whatever language was used in the
applicable BIT to qualify FET, thus practically harmonizing and stabilizing
the legal protection accorded to foreign investors under the standard. By
relying on teleological interpretation, they constructed an objective
obligation to respect foreign investors’ legitimate expectations, leaving little
to no room for discretion in finding violations.186 The end result was a
complete makeover of the FET standard, from an auxiliary BIT provision to
one of the cornerstones of the legal protection of foreign investors under the
global investment regime.

“has been widely used in hundreds of investment treaties throughout the world over the years with the
result that numerous arbitral tribunals have interpreted and applied it to investor-State disputes arising in
a wide variety of circumstances.” Id. In view of that, the Tribunal described the provision as a
“Grundnorm or basic norm of international investment law.” Id. ¶ 181. In Total, the Tribunal interpreted
the qualification “in accordance with the principles of international law” as a reference to general
international law. Total S.A. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on Liability, ¶¶
125–134
(Dec.
27,
2010),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/icsidblobs/onlineawards/C30/DC7833_en.pdf. The Tribunal derived
from this interpretation a general obligation on host states to respect their unilateral obligations as well
as foreign investors’ legitimate expectations. Id. This conclusion was reinforced by citing “the case law
of other arbitral tribunals in investment disputes interpreting and applying similarly worded investment
protection treaties.” Id. ¶ 126. The Arif Tribunal sidelined the requirement to accord FET “in accordance
with Public International Law principles” by simply noting that “neither party has raised the question of
whether this language limits the fair and equitable treatment standard to the minimum standard of
treatment of aliens in customary international law.” Arif v. Republic of Moldova, ICSID Case No.
ARB/11/23, Award, ¶¶ 526–530 (Apr. 8, 2013), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw1370.pdf. The Tribunal reasoned that FET provides a standard of treatment higher than
the MST and proclaimed that “this question, except in some very specific contexts such as Article 1105
of NAFTA, is increasingly of historic significance as the rapidly expanding practice on FET clauses in
treaties accelerates the development of customary international law.” Id.
184. Very few arbitral tribunals engaged in a detailed analysis of how the FET standard may have
changed the content of the MST under CIL. See, e.g., ADF Grp., Inc. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB/00/1,
Award, ¶¶ 175–186; Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v. Gov’t of Can., ICSID Case No. UNCT/07/1, Award,
¶¶ 189–213 (Mar. 31, 2010), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0504.pdf.
185. For a summary of the position of the NAFTA states on the question, see ADF Grp., ICSID Case
No. ARB/001/1, ¶ 179; Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award, ¶¶ 116, 118–127
(Oct. 11, 2002), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1076.pdf.
186. For a succinct explanation of the policy reasons for why arbitral tribunals may adopt this
approach, see Tecmed, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/2, ¶¶ 154, 156.
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E. Indirect Expropriation
The protection of foreign investors against expropriation by host states
was the raison d’être of the modern investment regime. The first generation
of BITs emerged in the late 1950s against the backdrop of widespread
hostility in the developing world toward FDI, which eventually begot a
policy program commonly referred to as the New International Economic
Order.187 At the heart of the fierce debates the New International Economic
Order engendered from the 1970s onward was the amount of compensation
payable by host states under CIL for the expropriation or nationalization of
foreign investors’ property.188
By the 1990s, this question was rendered moot thanks to hundreds of
newly concluded BITs that established “market value” as the standard of
compensation for the expropriation of foreign investments. Furthermore, due
to dramatic paradigm shifts in developing countries, direct expropriation,
i.e., the forcible physical taking of property, became something of the past.189
Nonetheless, legal debates over expropriation continued in international
investment law. A new challenging question arose over how to draw a
distinction between indirect expropriation, also known as regulatory taking,
and permissible, non-compensable regulation by host states. As of now, as
noted by the Tribunal in Feldman, “it is fair to say that no one has come up
with a fully satisfactory means of drawing this line.”190
Claimants typically argue that the existence of an expropriatory intent
on the part of host states can be relevant but should not be decisive.191 They
propose a definition of indirect expropriation that considers the disputed
measures’ actual effects on the value of the investment.192 By contrast,
respondents emphasize the importance of showing an intent to expropriate
the foreign investment, even if such an intent would not be the sole test for
187. See JERZY MAKARCZYK, PRINCIPLES OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: A STUDY
(1988).
188. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
14–15 (2d ed. 2012).
189. Incidents such as the forcible seizure of thousands of acres of land between 2001 and 2003 by
the Mugabe government in Zimbabwe are thus an exception rather than the rule. Notably, expropriated
landowners sought compensation under the Netherlands-Zimbabwe BIT. See Funnekotter v. Republic of
Zim.,
ICSID
Case
No.
ARB/05/6,
Award
(Apr.
22,
2009),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0349.pdf.
190. Feldman v. Mex., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, ¶ 100 (Dec. 16, 2002),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0319.pdf.
191. See, e.g., Rumeli Telekom A.S. v. Republic of Kaz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, ¶ 686
(July
29,
2008),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/parties_publications/C3765/Respondent%27s%20Counter
-Memorial/Pi%C3%A8ces%20juridiques/RL-0049.pdf.
192. Id.

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MAKING
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indirect expropriation.193 Moreover, they insist that non-discriminatory,
generally applicable regulations fall within host states’ police power and,
therefore, should not be deemed expropriatory.194
While the vast majority of BITs prohibit indirect expropriation using
slightly varying language, they rarely clarify how indirect expropriation
should be defined.195 The traditional methods of treaty interpretation under
the VCLT do not conclusively support any specific definition either. As a
result, tribunals sought guidance in secondary sources of international law.196
The different conclusions they reached cohered perfectly with the opposition
between the pluralist and harmonizing theories of international investment
law.
Only a small minority of tribunals based their definition of indirect
expropriation on host states’ expropriatory intent or, alternatively, the lack
of proportionality between the rationale for the disputed measures and the
harm inflicted upon the foreign investor.197 They noted that intent is
indispensable for finding indirect expropriation under CIL.198 To
substantiate this view, they highlighted the emphasis the Restatement Third
on the Law of Foreign Relations places on the role of host states’ intent in
this respect.199 The Restatement Third provides that:
A state is not responsible for loss of property or for other economic
disadvantage resulting from bona fide general taxation, regulation,
forfeiture for crime, or other action of the kind that is commonly accepted
as within the police power of states, if it is not discriminatory . . . and is
not designed to cause the alien to abandon the property to the state or sell
it at a distress price.200
193. Id. ¶ 692.
194. See, e.g., Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/2,
Award,
¶
97
(May
29,
2003),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/icsidblobs/onlineawards/C3785/DC4873_en.pdf.
195. The 2004 and 2012 U.S. Model BITs exceptionally provide an elaborate definition, yet neither
has provided conclusive guidance to arbitral tribunals. See 2004 U.S. Model BIT, Annex B, 2004,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/U.S.%20model%20BIT.pdf; 2012 U.S. Model BIT, Annex B, ¶ 4,
2012, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf.
196. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 712 (AM. L. INST. 1987).
197. Telenor Mobile Commc’ns A.S. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, Award, ¶
70
(Sept.
13,
2006),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C240/DC652_En.pdf; Cont’l Cas.
Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 276 (Sept. 5, 2008),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0228.pdf.
198. See Saluka Inv. B.V. (Neth.) v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, ¶ 254 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0740.pdf; Feldman v. Mex., ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, ¶¶ 103, 105 (Dec. 16, 2002), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0319.pdf.
199. Saluka, Perm. Ct. Arb., ¶ 260; Feldman, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, ¶ 105.
200. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 712 cmt. g (AM. L. INST.
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Accordingly, tribunals in this group affirmed the right of host states to
regulate in the public interest through non-discriminatory, generally
applicable policies, irrespective of the negative effects those policies might
have on foreign investors.201 They also pointed out that this right is
acknowledged by several draft conventions (an important secondary source
of international law).202 For instance, the 1961 Draft Convention on the
International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens considers the
action of the competent authorities of the state in the maintenance of public
order, health, or morality a non-compensable taking as long as, inter alia, it
was not “a clear and discriminatory violation of the law of the State
concerned.”203 Likewise, the notes and comments to Article 3 of the OECD
Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property state that “Article 3
acknowledges, by implication, the sovereign right of a State, under
international law, to deprive owners, including aliens, of property which is
within its territory in the pursuit of its political, social or economic ends.”204
Lastly, tribunals cited the jurisprudence of the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal (another important secondary source of international law).
The Iran-United States Tribunal decided several indirect expropriation
claims by American investors against the revolutionary government of Iran,
although outside of the ambit of international investment law. In Sea-Land
Service, for instance, the Tribunal seemed to favor the reliance on the host
state’s intent to define indirect expropriation.205 It held that “a finding of
expropriation would require, at the very least, that the Tribunal be satisfied
that there was deliberate governmental interference with the conduct of SeaLand’s operation, the effect of which was to deprive Sea-Land of the use and
benefit of its investment.”206
In the ISDS context, the decision in Saluka best exemplifies the
preceding approach to the definition of indirect expropriation. In this case,
the prohibition of expropriation in the applicable BIT between the Czech
Republic and the Netherlands was broad and did not carve out an exception
for non-compensable takings.207 Nevertheless, the Tribunal read that
1987) (emphasis added).
201. Saluka, Perm. Ct. Arb., ¶ 262; Feldman, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, ¶ 112.
202. See Saluka, Perm. Ct. Arb., ¶¶ 256–259 (referring to the Harvard and the OECD Draft
Conventions).
203. Saluka, Perm. Ct. Arb., ¶ 257.
204. OECD, OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, Notes and Comments
to Art. 3, 2 INT’L LAW. 331, 337 (1968).
205. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Gov’t of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 149,
166 (1984).
206. Id.
207. Saluka, Perm. Ct. Arb., ¶ 254.
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exception into the expropriation provision, asserting that under CIL “a
deprivation can be justified if it results from the exercise of regulatory
actions aimed at the maintenance of public order.”208 The Tribunal further
opined that, in principle, bona fide, non-discriminatory regulations do not
render host states liable for indirect expropriation and that the determination
of when regulation becomes an unlawful expropriation is left to arbitral
tribunals to decide on a case-by-case basis.209
The case-by-case analysis referred to in Saluka was employed by the
few tribunals that defined indirect expropriation using a proportionality test.
In those cases, tribunals jettisoned the categorical definitions of indirect
expropriation altogether.210 Instead, they opted for balancing the host state’s
right to regulate in the public interest, or more specifically the host state’s
regulatory objective or intent, against the harm suffered by the foreign
investor.211 Some tribunals defended this test by noting that CIL protects
foreigners from expropriation while simultaneously recognizing the host
state’s right to regulate in the public interest.212 Others did the same by
appealing to the jurisprudence of international courts.213 In a few exceptional
cases, tribunals relied on a mixed test that took into account the intent of the
host state and the foreign investor’s expectations.214
208. Id. ¶ 254 (emphasis added).
209. Id. ¶¶ 253–265.
210. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 60, at 134; e.g., Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v. United
Republic
of
Tanz.,
ICSID
Case
No.
ARB/05/22,
Award
(July
24,
2008),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C67/DC1589_En.pdf.
211. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA Arb. Trib., Partial Award, ¶¶ 281, 285, 287
(Schwartz, Chiasson, Hunter, Arbs. 2000), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0747.pdf (opining that indirect expropriation is found by looking at both the effects of the
disputed measures as well as the intent behind them). In Feldman, the Tribunal was cognizant of “the
ways in which governmental authorities may force a company out of business.” Feldman v. Mex., ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, ¶ 103 (Dec. 16, 2002) https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0319.pdf. Nevertheless, the Tribunal maintained that “at the same time, governments must
be free to act in the broader public interest through protection of the environment, new or modified tax
regimes, the granting or withdrawal of government subsidies, reductions or increases in tariff levels,
imposition of zoning restrictions and the like.” Id. As a result, the Tribunal used proportionality to settle
the indirect expropriation claim. Id.. See LG&E Energy Corp. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/1,
Decision
on
Liability,
¶¶
188–197
(Oct.
3,
2006),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C208/DC627_En.pdf (assessing the
indirect expropriation claim by comparing “two competing interests: the degree of the measure’s
interference with the right of ownership and the power of the State to adopt its policies”).
212. Feldman, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, ¶ 103.
213. To support its proportionality test for indirect expropriation, the Azurix Tribunal cited Tecmed
as well as the European Court of Human Rights’ decision in James and Others. Azurix Corp. v. Arg.
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶¶ 309–313 (July 14, 2006),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C5/DC507_En.pdf.
214. Methanex Corp. v. U.S., NAFTA Arb. Trib., Final Award, pt. IV, ch. D, ¶¶ 7–15 (Rowley,
Reisman, Veeder, Arbs. 2005), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0529.pdf
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The previous decisions on indirect expropriation unmistakably share a
pluralist orientation. They take the host state’s sovereign power to regulate
in the public interest as a baseline and, absent an expropriatory intent, allow
relatively greater encroachment on the foreign investment as a by-product of
regulation. The flexibility of this method, however, comes at the expense of
devising a universal definition of regulatory taking that is capable of
providing foreign investors with unified legal protection against indirect
expropriation. The reliance on expropriatory intent as the decisive factor in
finding indirect expropriation means that tribunals would have to judge the
validity of an enormously diverse set of regulatory objectives. Similarly, if
tribunals are to use a proportionality test, their decisions would vary
depending on their evaluation of the regulatory objectives of respondents
against the loss borne by claimants. In both cases, a case-by-case solution
would be the only viable option, which would translate into a reduction of
foreign investors’ ex-ante legal certainty given the endless conclusions
tribunals could reach.
The majority of arbitral tribunals adopted the alternative approach to
the definition of indirect expropriation, which looks at the effects of host
states’ measures on foreign investors.215 Tribunals explained their preference
for the effects test by the language of some BITs, which refers to indirect
expropriation as measures “having effect equivalent to expropriation.”216
The fact that BITs solely mention the effects of host states’ measures, while
saying nothing about intent, arguably provides a clear indication of how
indirect expropriation should be defined.217 But the persuasiveness of such a
test is undermined to the extent that varying language is used in BITs for the

(holding that indirect expropriation is established by showing an expropriatory intent or a violation of the
foreign investor’s legitimate expectations that are based on prior specific commitments given by the host
state); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 279 (Sept. 5, 2008),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0228.pdf (finding no indirect expropriation
in pesification, i.e., the conversion of the charges payable to the foreign investor from dollars to pesos,
due to the absence of legitimate expectations arising from specific commitments given by Argentina to
the claimant to that effect).
215. See, e.g., Rumeli Telekom A.S. v. Republic of Kaz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, ¶ 700
(July 29, 2008), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0728.pdf; Nat’l Grid
P.L.C. v. Arg. Republic, BIT Arb. Trib., Award, ¶¶ 146–153 (Garro, Kessler, Sureda, Arbs. 2008),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0555.pdf.
216. See, e.g., Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments Between the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Republic of Colombia,
Colom.-U.K., Mar. 17, 2010, art. 6-2(a), GR. BRIT. T.S. NO. 24 (2014) (Cm. 8973).
217. See, e.g., Rumeli Telekom A.S., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, ¶ 700; Nat’l Grid P.L.C., BIT Arb.
Trib., ¶¶ 146–153. In both cases, the tribunals noted that the provisions prohibiting indirect expropriation
in the applicable BITs make no reference to the intent of the host state. Consequently, they held that
claimants can establish indirect expropriation by only showing that the effect of the disputed measures
was to completely destroy the value of their property.
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prohibition of indirect expropriation.218
Beyond the preceding textualist argument, most tribunals that relied on
the effects test had recourse to secondary sources of international law that
were very similar to those invoked by the proponents of the intent test.
Reference was made to the Restatement Third of the Foreign Relations law,
which states in subsection (1) on the liability for improper takings that the
subsection “applies not only to avowed expropriations in which the
government formally takes title to property, but also to other actions of the
government that have the effect of ‘taking’ the property, in whole or in large
part, outright or in stages (‘creeping expropriation’).”219
The strongest support for the effects test was found in a series of
decisions rendered by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in which the
Tribunal’s findings were not based on the existence of an expropriatory
intent.220 For instance, the Tribunal held in the widely cited Tippetts case that
“the intent of the government is less important than the effects of the
measures on the owner, and the form of the measures of control or
interference is less important than the reality of their impact.”221
The foregoing perspective had so much resonance in investment
arbitration. In Santa Elena, one of the leading ISDS cases in this respect, the
Tribunal enforced the prohibition of indirect expropriation by devising a new
subrule rather than a standard.222 The subrule established a conclusive
presumption that indirect expropriation occurs whenever the effect of the
disputed measures is to deprive the foreign investor of normal control over
the property.223 The Santa Elena approach came to be known in both the case
218. See U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev., Expropriation: UNCTAD Series on International Investment
Agreements II, 2012, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/7 at 8 (noting that the majority of BITs refer
to indirect expropriation as “measures tantamount to an expropriation” rather than measures “having
effect equivalent to expropriation”).
219. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 712 (AM. L. INST. 1987)
(emphasis added).
220. Starret was the first case in which the question of indirect expropriation was addressed by the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. See Starret Hous. Corp. v. Iran, Interlocutory Award No. ITL 32-241 (Dec. 19, 1983), reprinted in 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 122 at 154 (1983). In SEDCO, the Tribunal was
of the opinion that whenever a measure “results in an outright transfer of title . . . a taking must be
presumed to have occurred.” SEDCO Inc. v. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co., 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 248, 275
(1985); see also Phelps Dodge Int’l Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 217-99-2 (Mar. 19,
1986), reprinted in 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 121, 130 (1987); Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran v. Iran,
Award No. 425-39-2 (June 29, 1989), reprinted in 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 79, 115 (1990).
221. Tippetts v. TAMS-AFFA, Award No. 141-7-2 (June 29, 1984), reprinted in 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 219, 225–26 (1986).
222. Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No.
ARB/96/1, Award, ¶¶ 76–77 (Feb. 17, 2000), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/italaw6340.pdf.
223. Id.
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law and the literature as the “sole effects doctrine.”224
Following Santa Elena, tribunals refused, in a series of early decisions,
to give weight to the defenses of host states that invoked their police power,
even if exercised in good faith and in a non-discriminatory fashion.225
Tribunals considered the effective neutralization of the economic benefit of
the foreign investment sufficient to establish indirect expropriation, as long
as the neutralization is substantial and either permanent or has long-lasting
effects.226 In a few cases, respondents argued for giving intent some role in
the definition of indirect expropriation, but tribunals decisively rejected that
proposition.227 Shortly after Santa Elena, the sole effects doctrine became
the dominant way of finding indirect expropriation in the case law.228
224. See, e.g., Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangl., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Award, ¶ 133 (June 30, 2009),
https://www.italaw.com/cases/951 (referring to the “soles effects doctrine”).
225. See Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA Arb. Trib., Interim Award, ¶¶ 96–102
(Dervaird, Greenberg, Belman, Arbs. 2000), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0674.pdf. The Pope & Talbot Tribunal rejected Canada’s argument that non-discriminatory
regulations should be considered a legitimate exercise of the host state’s police power. Id. However, the
Tribunal did not find that Canada’s export control regime violated NAFTA’s prohibition of indirect
expropriation because the level of interference with the foreign investor’s operations was not substantial
enough to warrant such a conclusion. Id.; see also Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCTRAL Arb. Trib.,
Final Award, ¶ 200 (Cutler, Briner, Klein, Arbs. 2001), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0451.pdf (defining indirect expropriation as any measure that “effectively neutralizes the
enjoyment of the property”); CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCTRAL Arb. Trib.,
Partial
Award,
¶¶
604–609
(Kühn,
Schwebel,
Hándl,
Arbs.
2001),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0178.pdf
(defining
“de
facto
expropriations or indirect expropriations” as the “measures that . . . effectively neutralize the benefit of
the property of the foreign owner”).
226. Id.
227. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB
(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶¶ 113–116 (May 29, 2003), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0854.pdf (rejecting the respondent’s argument that indirect expropriation should be found
by looking at the government’s intent behind the disputed measures rather than the measures’ effects);
Siemens AG v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶ 270 (Feb. 6, 2007),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0790.pdf (favoring a definition of indirect
expropriation that solely considers the effects of the disputed measures and adding that intent is related
to the purpose of indirect expropriation, not the determination of whether an indirect expropriation has
occurred in the first place); Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/3, Award, ¶¶ 7.5.11–7.5.20 (Aug. 20, 2007), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0215.pdf.
228. See, e.g., Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/02/01,
Award, ¶ 176 (July 17, 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0331.pdf;
Telenor Mobile Commc’ns A.S. v. Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, Award, ¶¶ 67, 70 (Sept. 13,
2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0858.pdf; Saipem S.p.A. v. Bangl.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Award, ¶¶ 133–134 (June 30, 2009), https://www.italaw.com/cases/951;
Suez v. Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 132–134 (July 30, 2010),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0826.pdf; Spyridon Roussalis v. Rom.,
ICSID
Case
No.
ARB/06/1,
Award,
¶
330
(Dec.
1,
2011),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0723.pdf; Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Mar.
Servs. GmbH v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/8, Excerpts of Award, ¶ 304 (Mar. 1, 2012),
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Within this line of cases, a number of tribunals expanded the definition
of indirect expropriation under the sole effects doctrine so as to include not
only the deprivation of the benefit of property, but also the defeat of the
foreign investor’s expectations. The Tribunal in Metalclad, for example,
defined indirect expropriation as any measure “which has the effect of
depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonablyto-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the
obvious benefit of the host State.”229
The numerous decisions in favor of the effects test are perfectly in line
with the harmonizing theory of international investment law. On the one
hand, the effects test presumes that host states’ sovereign regulatory powers
are, by default, restricted under international investment law. The test
imposes an objective obligation on host states to refrain from the
nullification of the value of the foreign investment under any
circumstances.230 Once a permanent or long-lasting, substantial deprivation
of the investment is established, the host state would be held liable for
indirect expropriation, even if it establishes a legitimate public purpose
behind the disputed measures.231
On the other hand, and more importantly, constructing such an
objective obligation allows tribunals to provide foreign investors with
unified legal protection against indirect expropriation. First, it neutralizes
any variation in the definition of indirect expropriation across BITs. Second,
and contrary to the intent test or proportionality, it spares tribunals the need
to expansively use discretion or pass judgment on the validity of host states’

https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1411.pdf; Burlington Res. Inc. v.
Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 393–401 (Dec. 14, 2012),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1094_0.pdf.
229. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶¶ 103, 111
(Aug. 30, 2000), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0510.pdf; see also Waste
Mgmt. Inc. v. United Mexican States [II], Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, ¶ 159,
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0900.pdf (fully adopting Metalclad and,
thus, finding no indirect expropriation since the foreign investor was not deprived of a “reasonably-tobe-expected economic benefit”); Occidental Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No.
UN3467, Final Award, ¶¶ 87–88 (July 1, 2004), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0571.pdf (citing Metalclad, especially depriving the foreign investor of a “reasonably-tobe-expected economic benefit”).
230. Note that this transforms host states’ obligation from an obligation of means into an obligation
of result. This actually can be said whenever tribunals conclude that host states can be held liable even if
they do not intend to inflict harm upon the foreign investor. As we saw before, this is the case under the
dominant interpretation of the FET and NT standards.
231. Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1,
Award, ¶ 71 (Feb. 17, 2000), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw6340.pdf;
Tecmed, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, ¶ 122; Compañía de Aguas, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, ¶
7.5.21.
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public policy goals. As a result, the prohibition of indirect expropriation is
made more certain ex ante across borders.
IV. THE MAINSTREAM VIEW IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
The previous section explored in detail how the pluralist and
harmonizing theories of international investment law inform the
jurisprudential divides over the five main provisions of BITs. It showed that
the case law is far from chaotic, and that a distinct, stable mainstream view
can be discerned in the jurisprudence on at least four of those provisions.
This section summarizes the findings of the last section as a first step
toward conceptualizing the mainstream view in investment arbitration. It
introduces two policy objectives that can be deduced from the decisions
comprising the mainstream view, which together provide a deeper
explanation for tribunals’ preference for harmonization. The section also
discusses how the consideration of the mainstream view may shift the
debates over the reform of the investment regime.
A. The Mainstream View Synthesized
The table below (“the table”) pieces together the findings of the
previous analysis of the case law. It lists the interpretative techniques
pluralist and harmonizing tribunals use to put their preferred theory of
international investment law into action when settling investment disputes.
The majority and minority positions in the case law are also specified.232
Legal Issue
Definition
of
investment
in BITs
(jurisdiction
of ICSID
tribunals)

The Pluralist Theory

•

Varying
definitions of
investment
(party autonomy)

The Harmonizing
Theory
•

Harmonized
definition of
investment
(double keyhole)

232. While it goes beyond the scope of this research, an empirical analysis of the competition
between pluralist and harmonizing tribunals is perfectly doable using the theoretical framework
developed in this Article.
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Legal
Issue

•

Definition
of
investmen
t in BITs
(jurisdicti
on of
ICSID
tribunals)

•

•
•
•

Discrimin
a-tion
under the
NT
standard

The Harmonizing
Theory

The Pluralist Theory

•

•
•
•

Subjective
jurisdictional test
(definition of
investment in
BITs)
Textualist
interpretation of
the definition of
investment in
BITs/textualist
interpretation of
Article 25 of the
ICSID
Convention
Case-by-case
determination of
jurisdiction
Minority in the
case law
Flexible
definition of
differentiation
between national
and foreign
investors
Subjective test for
discrimination
(host state’s
intent, a mix of
intent and effects
of host state’s
measures)
Proportionality
Case-by-case
determination of
discrimination
Small minority in
the case law

•

•

•
•

•

•

•

•
•

Objective
jurisdictional test
(criteria of
“investment” under
Article 25 of the
ICSID Convention)
Teleological
interpretation of
Article 25 of the
ICSID Convention
Universal
determination of
jurisdiction
Majority in the
case law
Vertical
harmonization of
the standards
applicable to
national and
foreign investors
Objective test for
discrimination
(effects of host
state’s measures)
Categorical
reasoning/
refutable
presumption
Universal
determination of
discrimination
Large majority in
the case law
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Legal
Issue

The Pluralist Theory
•

Procedure
s under
the MFN
clause

•

•

Varying ISDS
mechanisms in
different BITs
(party autonomy)
Teleological
interpretation of
the MFN clause
(distinction
between
substance and
procedure)
No clear majority
in the case law

The Harmonizing Theory
•

•

•
•

•

•
•
Content of
FET

•
•

Varying
definitions of
FET (party
autonomy)
Subjective test
(bad faith, willful
disregard)
Textualist
interpretation of
FET (“fair” and
“equitable”)
/language of the
BIT/
proportionality
Case-by-case
determination of
FET content
Minority in the
case law

[Vol 32:287

•

•

•
•

Harmonized ISDS
mechanisms in
different BITs
(equality)
Textualist
interpretation of
the MFN clause
(“all matters”
subject to the BIT,
no distinction
between substance
and procedure)
No clear majority
in the case law
Harmonized
definition of FET
(evolving CIL)
Objective test
(investors’
legitimate
expectations)
Teleological
interpretation of
FET (legal
security)/categoric
al reasoning
(legitimate
expectations)/refut
able
presumption/rare
use of
proportionality
Universal
determination of
FET content
Majority in the
case law
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Legal
Issue

The Pluralist Theory

The Harmonizing Theory

•

Contextual
definition of
• Harmonized
indirect
definition of
expropriation
indirect
• Subjective test
expropriation
(host state’s
• Objective test
intent/a mix of
(effects of host
intent and effects
state’s measures)
of host state’s
• Textualist
measures)
Definition
interpretation
• Teleological
of indirect
(“having the effect
interpretation
expropriaof”)/categorical
(reading policetion
reasoning/irrefutab
power exception
le presumption
into
• Universal
BITs)/proportiona
determination of
lity
indirect
• Case-by-case
expropriation
determination of
• Majority in the
indirect
case law
expropriation
• Minority in the
case law
The right column of the table offers a holistic picture of what this
Article calls the mainstream view in investment arbitration. Besides the
technicalities of legal reasoning, two important policy objectives can be
deduced from the harmonizing interpretative techniques used by tribunals
comprising this mainstream view: reinforcing global competition among
foreign investors and increasing legal certainty across borders. These
objectives offer further insights into the normative commitments underlying
the harmonizing jurisprudence. They also shed light on important yet often
neglected aspects of the role ISDS plays in the governance of FDI.
B. Reinforcing Global Competition Among Foreign Investors
The harmonizing interpretative techniques used by the majority of
arbitral tribunals suggest that ISDS plays a specific role in the governance of
FDI that is quite distinct from what is commonly understood as its main
function. The conventional wisdom on ISDS is that it primarily exists to
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compensate for institutional failures in developing host states, which would
otherwise inhibit FDI flows to these countries.233 This is accomplished by
providing an independent, depoliticized forum for the settlement of
investment disputes.234 As shown by the right column of the table, the
majority of tribunals assume a role that goes well beyond dispute settlement.
Specifically, most tribunals seek to equalize the treatment of all foreign
investors by harmonizing the legal standards applicable to them.
The pursuit of treatment equalization can be clearly seen on two
different levels. The first is horizontal, i.e., among different foreign
investors. The majority of arbitral tribunals operationalize BITs in a way that
ensures that investors from different home states are treated as equally as
possible by any individual host state.235 This is done by turning the bilaterally
negotiated standards of BITs into universal standards, unless such
transformation is made absolutely impossible by the applicable BIT.
Vertically, i.e., between foreign investors and the national investors of a
certain host state, most tribunals adopt an interpretation of the NT standard
that guarantees that both foreign and national investors receive the same
exact treatment from the host state.236
Of course, it is hard to specify with certainty a single explanation for
arbitral tribunals’ keenness to equalize foreign investors’ treatment.
Probably, it is more driven by some theory of equality or fairness in
international investment relationships than an economic view about what the
global FDI market should be. But, regardless of the underlying motivation,
the two-dimensional treatment equalization process in ISDS renders BITs,
as operationalized by the majority of arbitral tribunals, an important means
of reinforcing global competition among foreign investors.
This pro-competition inclination can help clarify the animosity of
harmonizing tribunals toward regulatory diversity or pluralism, whether in
the form of varying BIT provisions or discrepancies in the treatment of
233. Andrew Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 658 (1997); Tom Ginsburg, International
Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Governance, 25 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 107, 113 (2005); Dana Krueger, The Combat Zone: Mondev Int’l, Ltd. v. United States and the
Backlash Against NAFTA Chapter 11, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 399, 420 (2003); Charles N. Brower & Stephen
W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI.
J. INT’L L. 471, 497 (2009); SCHILL, supra note 8, at 3–6; DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 60, at 235.
234. This view has been put forward mainly by scholars who invoke obsolescing bargains or dynamic
inconsistency as the raison d’être of the modern ISDS system. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 233, at 113,
658. For a slightly different view, see Krueger, supra note 233, at 420; Brower & Schill, supra note 233,
at 497; SCHILL, supra note 8, at 3–6; DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 60, at 235.
235. See supra Section III for a discussion of the mainstream view on the definition of investment,
FET, and indirect expropriation.
236. See supra Section III for a discussion of the mainstream view on NT.
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foreign and national investors by host states. Under either form of regulatory
pluralism, foreign investors would be treated differently, depending on what
is bilaterally agreed upon in the applicable BIT. This would make
international investment law an additional barrier to the “free” flow of FDI
across borders, instead of being a tool for furthering openness in a global
FDI market that is already tightly controlled by national governments. So,
by trying to neutralize regulatory differences, harmonizing tribunals strive to
reinforce “fair” competition, not only among foreign investors but also
among host states vying for FDI. Bringing this deep commitment to
competition to light is crucial for understanding, let alone contesting, a subtle
aspect of the mainstream view that goes largely unnoticed in both the
literature and the current reform debates.
C. Increasing Legal Certainty Across Borders
The majority of arbitral tribunals not only seek to equalize the treatment
of all foreign investors, but also try to minimize legal uncertainty under the
investment regime. This aspect of the mainstream view can be inferred from
the preference of most tribunals to minimize the room for discretion in ISDS.
The right column of the table shows that tribunals achieve this goal by
heavily relying on categorical subrules rather than standards, objective rather
than subjective tests, and presumptions rather than proportionality.
Similar to the commitment to reinforcing global competition among
foreign investors, naming a specific rationale for the mainstream preference
for a more inflexible, or less discretionary, functioning of the investment
regime is a challenging task. The political economy of judging provides three
possible explanations. First, tribunals limit their own discretion in order to
reinforce the legitimacy of ISDS since objectivity is more likely to be
perceived by litigants as fair or impersonal. Second, the objective approach
to ISDS perfectly coheres with arbitrators’ self-interest as it allows them to
preserve a professional, impartial standing, which is necessary for arbitral
appointments in future cases. Third, objectivity is one of few coordination
mechanisms available for tribunals to produce coherent case law that makes
future dispute settlement easier and reflects positively on the system and its
likelihood to continue to exist.
Whatever the actual rationale might be, inflexibility in ISDS minimizes
the possibility of reaching different conclusions in similar cases and thus
renders the legal protections available to foreign investors highly certain ex
ante. This outcome vindicates this Article’s claim that ISDS does more than
merely providing an independent ad hoc dispute settlement mechanism. The
vast majority of investment tribunals seem to entertain a very particular view
of what an optimal investment regime should look like. Under this regime,
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the substance of the standards of treatment applicable to foreign investors is
largely known in advance, and not dependent on the subjective intent of host
states or the discretionary power of arbitral tribunals.
The significance of ex-ante certainty can be illustrated by looking at the
protection against indirect expropriation. Despite being one of the main
sources of political risk, indirect expropriation remains extremely elusive to
a priori define. Indeed, scholars note the impossibility of providing foreign
investors with perfect information about the forms of indirect expropriation
they are exposed to prior to establishment.237 As previously explained, the
majority of arbitral tribunals overcome this problem by applying the
prohibition of indirect expropriation in an objective manner, meaning that
they consider any long-lasting neutralization of the value of the investment
an illegitimate, hence compensable, regulatory taking.238 By guaranteeing
compensation in these circumstances, tribunals significantly reduce preestablishment uncertainty under the investment regime.
With more ex-ante certainty, foreign investors can predict and compare,
with considerable precision, the cost of investing in different host states.
Likewise, they can avoid any unanticipated costs that may arise from either
regulatory diversity across borders or potential disputes with host states.
Creating a global investment regime along those lines necessarily involves a
particular understanding of “costs” in FDI, as well as the role international
investment law should play in minimizing or eliminating such costs, instead
of itself being a source of an “arbitrary” cost.
D. The Mainstream View and the Question of Reform
So far, the commitment to harmonization in ISDS, with its dual
objective of reinforcing global competition and legal certainty across
borders, has mostly gone unnoticed in the debates over the reform of the
investment regime. At a very basic level, taking note of the mainstream view
in investment arbitration alleviates one of the main concerns that has been
voiced about ISDS in recent years, namely jurisprudential fragmentation.239
More fundamentally, the mainstream view poses a novel question to
reformers about whether the harmonization trend in ISDS should be
supported or curtailed. Obviously, different answers to this question would
lead to different reforms. The analysis of the case law in this Article shows
that the majority of arbitral tribunals believe that legal harmonization is part
and parcel of the legal protection of foreign investors under international
237. See Jason Webb Yackee, Political Risk and International Investment Law, 24 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 477, 488 (2014).
238. See supra notes 222–231 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 5–11 and accompanying text.
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investment law. Tribunals generally assume that investors are harmed not
only when they are mistreated by host states, but also when they are put in a
disadvantaged position vis-à-vis other investors with regard to accessing
investment opportunities in host states.
From this vantage point, the harmonizing role of arbitral tribunals,
currently carried out with very modest coordination mechanisms, is actually
part of the success, rather than the failure, of the ISDS system. Consequently,
any future reform of the investment regime should aim to support this role.
Ideally, states would adopt more harmonized rules that would facilitate the
equalization of the treatment of foreign investors globally.240 Assuming that
this option is infeasible at the moment, which seems a more realistic
assessment, reformers should ensure, at a minimum, that they do not obstruct
the harmonization trend in ISDS. While harmonization has been achieved in
ISDS with varying degrees of success, one may argue, in light of the
mainstream view, that arbitral tribunals, if left to their own devices, would
move the ISDS system toward more harmonization over time.241
By contrast, harmonization can be viewed as a problematic aspect of
contemporary ISDS practice for a variety of reasons. The first relates to
whether arbitral tribunals have the authority to turn bilaterally negotiated
standards into a de facto multilateral investment regime that, in principle,
provides all foreign investors with identical protection. As previously noted,
reaching conclusions in this regard is no easy task given the fact that the
interpretations of both pluralist and harmonizing tribunals are perfectly
plausible under the VCLT.242
Another possible objection to harmonization is more policy oriented.
Assuming that harmonization can be fully justified under the VCLT, it may
still be an undesirable interpretative strategy as it might result in more
fragmentation of international investment law. For instance, the mainstream
interpretation of FET neutralizes one way or another the doctrinal differences
among different FET standards. The insistence on harmonizing FET has
pushed some states in recent years to modify their BITs by adding various
qualifications to the language of the FET standard.243 Similarly, states sought
240. Mark Feldman, How Can We Harmonise International Investment Law?, WORLD ECON. F.
(Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/08/how-can-we-harmonise-internationalinvestment-law/.
241. For instance, Kaj Hobér notes that “the rules of interpretation are sometimes understood
differently and not always applied consistently. The consequence is a certain degree of uncertainty and
unpredictability.” Hobér, supra note 8, at 433. Hobér, nevertheless, anticipates that “[o]ver time,
however, the gradual development of arbitral jurisprudence will result in a coherent and predicable body
of international investment law.” Id.
242. See generally supra Section III(e) regarding the discussion on indirect expropriation.
243. In 2006, the Mexico-Spain BIT overturned Tecmed by adding an explicit reference to CIL to
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to curtail the objective interpretation of the prohibition of indirect
expropriation that allowed investment tribunals to adopt a unified
interpretation of regulatory taking across all BITs.244 This was done by
supplementing BITs with either an additional clarificatory clause or a
general exception clause similar to Article XX of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade and Article XIV of the General Agreement on Trade in
Services with a view to carving out exceptions for non-compensable
regulation.245 In both cases, harmonization caused states to react in ways that
increased rather than decreased the doctrinal fragmentation of international
investment law.
A third objection might be that abridging the regulatory differences
foreign investors are exposed to across borders undermines competition for
FDI among host states and can eventually harm foreign investors. Whether
these differences are embodied in unique formulations of BIT provisions or
in variations of the treatment given by host states to national versus foreign
investors, they arguably promote institutional competition among host states,
which actually benefits foreign investors. Accordingly, in this view,
regulatory pluralism should be considered a crucial constituent element of
the global FDI market rather than a “distortion” thereof.
The preceding objections to harmonization (equivalently, the support of
pluralism) lead to reform proposals that are diametrically opposed to the
harmonization-driven reform agenda. Opponents of harmonization would
assert that ISDS should be a neutral dispute settlement mechanism that
simply applies whatever rules the state parties to BITs agree to bilaterally,
without engaging in any “regime-building.” So, the problem from this
perspective is not jurisprudential fragmentation. It is rather the expansive
power arbitral tribunals wield in the ISDS system that enabled them in the
span of two decades to turn ISDS into a legal system that is far more intrusive
than what its founding fathers had originally envisioned.246
An anti-harmonization, i.e., a pluralist, reform agenda would thus
prioritize reigning in the power of arbitral tribunals over improving
coherence in ISDS, especially in light of the increasing number of influential
states that are breaking away from the investment regime.247 At the very
least, reformers would weigh the benefits of improving coherence by, for
example, creating a new ISDS mechanism, such as the proposed multilateral
the FET standard. BIT, Mex.-Spain, supra note 141, art. 4-1.
244. U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev., supra note 218, at 86–90.
245. Id.
246. Sornarajah, supra note 7, at 41.
247. See Mohammad Hamdy, Redesign as Reform: A Critique of the Design of Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 51 GEO. J. INT’L L. 255, 257–59 (2020).
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investment court, or adding another layer of dispute settlement, e.g., an
appellate mechanism, against costs, both intended and unintended.248 Such
costs would include pushing more states to de-link themselves from the
investment regime and potentially worsening jurisprudential fragmentation
if the new mechanisms are met with limited buy-in from states.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article argued that arbitral tribunals are split between two
competing theories of international investment law. The first, the pluralist
theory, views BITs as peculiar contracts between two states, while the
second, the harmonizing theory, considers BITs a means to opt into the
global investment regime, which is thought to exist independently of
individual BITs. The two theories support radically different modes of
operationalizing BITs and, accordingly, lead to conflicting legal outcomes.
Pluralist tribunals are more tolerant of the diversity of the standards
applicable to different foreign investors. Therefore, they strictly adhere to a
case-by-case approach to ISDS. On the contrary, the main goal of
harmonizing tribunals is to level the playing field among foreign investors
under the investment regime. They utilize ISDS not only to settle disputes
but also to equalize the treatment of foreign investors.
The Article showed that, notwithstanding these structural
disagreements, the decisions of the vast majority of arbitral tribunals
manifest a firm devotion to the harmonizing theory of international
investment law. In view of that, the Article argued that contrary to the
prevalent critiques of ISDS of being chaotic or messy, the case law is actually
stabilized by a distinct, sizeable mainstream view. The Article described in
detail the jurisprudential aspects of this mainstream view, noting the
reinforcement of both global competition among foreign investors and legal
certainty across borders as two fundamental objectives of the harmonizing
jurisprudence. It lastly addressed some of the implications of taking note of
248. On the proposal to establish a new multilateral investment court, see Commission TTIP Textual
Proposal on Investment Protection and Investment Court System, at 19–22 (Nov. 12, 2015),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf. The proposal to establish an
appellate mechanism in ISDS is much older. See, e.g., Van Vechten Veeder, The Necessary Safeguards
of an Appellate System, 2 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 6, 6–7 (2005); Johanna Kalb, Creating an ICSID
Appellate Body, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 179, 183–86 (2005); Christian J. Tams, An
Appealing Option? The Debate About an ICSID Appellate Structure, 57 ESSAYS IN TRANSNAT’L ECON.
L. 1, 5–6 (2006); Asif H. Qureshi, An Appellate System in International Investment Arbitration?, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1154, 1155–58 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds.
2008); Gabriel Bottini, Should Arbitrators Live on Mars? Challenge of Arbitrators in Investment
Arbitration, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 341 (2009); Christopher Smith, The Appeal of ICSID
Awards: How the AMINZ Appellate Mechanism Can Guide Reform of ICSID Procedures, 41 GA. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 567, 571 (2013).
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this mainstream view in the debates over the reform of the investment
regime.
It should be noted, however, that the Article’s conclusion about the
existence of a distinct mainstream view in investment arbitration does not
amount to a claim of substantive consistency in the views of individual
arbitrators. The dominance of the harmonizing theory by no means negates
the possibility that specific arbitrators, or even tribunals, may be ambivalent
between the two competing theories.249 In fact, tribunals may alternate
between the two theories in the same case,250 and sometimes with respect to
the same issue.251 But, overall, it is safe to say that, most of the time, most
tribunals depict harmonizing rather than pluralist tendencies in their
interpretation of the main provisions of BITs.
More importantly, the Article’s argument about the centrality of
harmonization in the case law raises important questions about the future of
the investment regime. For instance, we may inquire about the substantive
standards set as the goal for harmonization, and whether it is possible to
reorient harmonization toward other standards. We may also wonder if
harmonization is a necessary precondition for competition under the global
investment regime, or it is possible to have competition without
249. Dolzer and Schreuer, for instance, support a pluralist approach to the definition of investment.
See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 60, at 76. They generally disapprove of tribunals’ expansive use
of discretion to construct an objective definition under Article 25 of the ICSID Convection independently
of the BIT definitions of investment. Id. By contrast, Dolzer and Schreuer prefer a harmonized
determination of the content of the FET standard, arguing in support of an objective test for violations of
FET that “the principle of FET allows for independent and objective third party determination of this type
of behavior on the basis of a flexible standard.” Id. at 133–34.
250. Salini is a good case in point. As we saw earlier, the Salini Tribunal established four objective
requirements a financial undertaking must meet in order to have an “investment” under Article 25 of the
ICSID Convention, regardless of the definition chosen in the BIT. By doing so, the Tribunal practically
harmonized the definitions of investment in BITs and, more importantly, unified the scope of the subjectmatter jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the
Tribunal was totally pluralistic with respect to the scope of the MFN clause. See supra note 117 and
accompanying text. It rejected the harmonized reading of the clause by drawing a distinction between
the substantive and procedural provisions of BITs and by asserting that MFN treatment does not apply to
the latter absent an agreement by the state parties. Id. The corollary of this view is that different foreign
investors have access to different ISDS mechanisms, depending on the applicable BIT.
251. In Glamis, for instance, the Tribunal responded to the claimant’s argument that the FET standard
has converged with the MST under CIL by noting that “[i]t is . . . necessary to look to the underlying fair
and equitable treatment clause of each treaty, and the reviewing tribunal’s analysis of that treaty, to
determine whether or not they are drafted with an intent to refer to customary international law.” Glamis
Gold, Ltd. v. U.S., Award, ¶ 609 (ICSID 2009), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0378.pdf. A few paragraphs later, the Tribunal embraced the test promoted by harmonizing
tribunals under NAFTA, which is premised on the evolution of the MST into a new universal FET
standard that could be breached without bad faith on the part of the host state. Id. ¶ 616. The Tribunal
explained that “one aspect of evolution from Neer that is generally agreed upon is that bad faith is not
required to find a violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard.” Id.
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harmonization. Under the latter arrangement, host states would be allowed
to compete for FDI by offering foreign investors “better” legal institutions,
whether through BITs or under domestic law. In this case, international
investment law would become a locale for competition and diversity, not
harmonization. Assuming, arguendo, that we conclude that harmonization is
indispensable for competition, we would have to consider the outer limits
that should be set for such a project if we do not want all states to eventually
collapse into the same regulatory model. We may even question the role of
competition in the global FDI market in the first place, specifically the
possibility of regulating FDI on a different basis altogether. Answering these
questions can completely reshape international investment law as we know
it.

